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Abstract
Title: Is there sufficient guidance to detect and obtain a conviction for
occupational fraud in Ireland?
Author: Carmel Buttimer FCA, BBS
There has been an increased focus in the Irish media on fraud, particularly since
the collapse of Anglo Irish Bank in 2007. There has however been little academic
research undertaken into occupational fraud in Ireland. This study will examine
whether or not the current guidance to detect and convict occupational fraud in
Ireland is sufficient.
This study achieves its objective by examining the content of press articles
reporting thirty-five occupational fraud cases convicted in Ireland in the period
2002 to 2013. It categorises the content of the articles using a framework
developed by Cohen et al. (2010), which combines the Fraud Triangle (FT) with
the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). It then uses qualitative and quantitative
analysis to determine if these aspects of fraud are present in the relevant auditing
standard (ISA 240: The auditor’s responsibilities relating to fraud in an audit of
financial statements).
This study found ISA 240 sufficient in its coverage of the ‘opportunity’ to commit
fraud, but insufficient in its coverage of the ‘incentive/pressure’ and
‘attitude/rationalisation’ elements to commit fraud. It suggests the addition of
lavish lifestyle, greed, pressure from criminals, depression, concern for others
and paying back for previous fraud to the examples of ‘incentive/pressure’ in the
audit standard. It suggests the addition of sense of entitlement, no apparent
regard for the crime, complicity in undertaking a fraud, weak personality, lack of
business knowledge, looking out for the good of the company, charitable actions
for the good of others and paying back for previous frauds to the examples of
‘attitude/rationalisation’ in the audit standard. Undeniably, it would be
impossible to provide an exhaustive list of all circumstances under which fraud is
undertaken; however by including the examples of frauds compiled in this study,
further guidance can be provided to auditors.
The inadequacy of the auditing standard is not the only reason why the number of
convictions for occupational fraud is low. This study finds the multifarious
methods of committing fraud, the status of the fraudster, difficulties in detecting
fraud, advances in technology, law and auditing standards not keeping pace,
reluctance by organisations to report fraud, and the fact that predatory fraudsters
target organisations and therefore not all frauds are accidental, as factors
keeping the conviction rate for occupational fraud so low in Ireland.
It is important that the professional standards and the resources of those charged
with detecting and prosecuting fraud in Ireland be strengthened to give further
confidence in the prevention, detection, and conviction of fraud. This should lead
to a reduction in the effects of fraud in organisations and in wider society.
vii

Chapter 1 Introduction to this Research Study
1.1

Introduction

This chapter introduces this research by providing a background to the study and
demonstrating how, using a review of extant literature, the researcher identified a
gap in the literature. This chapter describes the research objective and the
questions posed to fulfil this objective. It acknowledges the limitations of the
research. This chapter closes with the provision of the structure of the dissertation.

1.2

Background to the Study

Recently there has been an increased focus on examining corporate fraud, due
mainly to major financial scandals such as the collapse of Enron, Tyco and
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC in the US and Diageo Plc. and
BAE in the UK. In Ireland, the Fyffe’s and DCC case, Greencore and the collapse
of Anglo Irish Bank have been extensively reported on in the press. PwC (2014)
reported that over 26% of the companies in Ireland were victims of economic
crime, which includes fraud. The CSO (2014) indicated that there were over five
thousand “fraud, deception and related crimes” documented in the first quarter of
2014 in Ireland. These high profile cases have affected many stakeholders
including shareholders, creditors and the wider society, and as a consequence
public confidence in financial systems has been negatively affected (Pan et al.,
2011).

When fraud is uncovered, auditors are often castigated for not warning about the
financial position of the companies or for failing to detect the frauds which led to
collapse of the organisation (Dennis, 2010; Gold et al., 2012). However the
relevant auditing standard in Ireland, ISA 240 “The Auditors Responsibility to
Consider Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements (2004), highlights that it is the
1

management of the organisation that is primarily responsible for detecting fraud
and that the auditors are responsible for reassuring that the accounts present a true
and fair view. It states that:

“the primary responsibility for the prevention and detection
of fraud rests with those charged with governance of the
entity and management” (ISA 240, 2004, p. 157).

The auditor is:

“responsible for obtaining reasonable assurance that the
financial statements taken as a whole are free from material
misstatement, whether caused by fraud or error” (ISA 240,
p.158)

The difference between actual and expected performance of the auditor is referred
to in the literature as the “audit expectation gap” (Liggio, 1974; Dennis, 2010).
Auditors utilise and rely on the auditing standards to guide their approach to their
audits. It is therefore imperative that auditing standards are comprehensive and
relevant to encompass as many possible situations that the auditors may
encounter.

1.3

Gaps in the Literature

The three themes examined in fraud research since the 1940s are the factors,
motivations and antecedents of fraud, the auditors’ role in fraud detection and
prevention, and the impact of advances in Information Technology (IT) on fraud
(Pan et al., 2011). Cooper and Dacin (2013) reviewed available research of fraud,
concluding that the areas which should be emphasised are fraud in the context of
not only the individual, but where it takes place, that is the firm, the industry and
society in general. Hogan et al. (2008) and Trompeter et al. (2013) identified the
dearth of research into methods to assist auditors detect fraud beyond “red-flags”.

2

Cressey (1950, 1953) developed the Fraud Triangle (FT), upon which much of the
work undertaken in fraud prevention and detection is predicated (Comer, 1998;
Skousen et al., 2009). The FT states that three elements, namely pressure,
opportunity, and rationalisation, must exist for a fraud to take place. The
individual elements of the fraud triangle have been studied extensively with
expansions on emphasis and examples suggested. For example pressure has been
expanded to include non-financial and external expectations (Koh et al., 2008;
Perol and Lougee, 2011), opportunity has been divided into preventative,
detective and corrective (Coenen, 2008) and rationalisation was expanded to
consider the personal integrity of managers (Hernández and Groot, 2007).

The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1974; Beck and
Ajzen, 1991) has been utilised to explain the intentions underlying dishonest
actions in a number of different setting and industries. Cohen et al. (2010)
combined the FT with the TPB to construct a framework which they call the
FT/TPB framework. Employing this framework, they examined evidence from the
press reports of thirty-nine cases between 1992 and 2005 in the United States to
highlight the behavioural traits of fraudsters. Resulting from this research they
recommend additions to the US auditing standards as some of their observed
behaviours of fraudster were not included in the auditing guidelines. Cohen et al.
(2010) called for the robustness of their findings to be investigated in different
cultural and institutional contexts.

“However, fraud is of course not limited to the U.S. and many
countries have faced similar situations. It would be
interesting to extend the scope of study to non-U.S.
companies…. to investigate the robustness of our results in
different cultural and institutional contexts” (Cohen et al.,
2010, p.289).

3

Trompeter et al. (2013) described Cohen et al.’s (2010) research as “novel and
unique” (p. 293) and encouraged others to use this type of methodology in the
future.

Cohen et al. (2010) and Soltani (2014) drew attention to the importance of further
analysis of European corporate fraud cases. Cohen et al.(2010) felt that manager’s
“behaviour in fraud commitment has been relatively unexplored” (Cohen et al,
2010, p. 271), noting that Europe had little research in this area. Soltani (2014)
identified that the strong media coverage together with the size of the US financial
markets is one of the determining factors in the extensive dialogue and
investigation of corporate fraud in the United States as compared to Europe. In the
case of European corporate failure cases “there are serious deficiencies” (Soltani,
2014, p. 252) as far as academic publications and media coverage are concerned.

This research answers these calls for research by examining the adequacy of the
relevant auditing standard (ISA 240) to detect occupational fraud 1 in Ireland,
utilising the FT/TPB framework. This study will analyse the content of the press
reports of Irish occupational fraud cases to execute this exploratory, descriptive
research objective in an Irish context.

Furthermore there appears, from the scarcity of convictions for fraud, to be a huge
difficulty, not only in detecting, but also in convicting for fraud in Ireland:

“Ireland’s record in prosecuting significant white-collar crime is
far from impressive. Despite the huge banking scandals over the
years, only two people have gone to jail: John Ransack and the
late Patrick Gallagher. Neither was prosecuted in this
jurisdiction.” (Keena, 2010, p. 23)

1

Occupational fraud covers Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR) and Asset Misappropriation
(AM). These are also the categories of occupational fraud included in ISA 240 “The Auditors’
responsibilities relating to fraud in an audit of Financial Statements” (2004). See Appendix A.

4

This has motivated the researcher to examine not only the adequacy of the
auditing standard to detect fraud, but also to explore the other factors that may be
deterring the conviction for fraud in Ireland. The combination of these factors led
to the formation by the researcher of the research objective.

1.4

Research Objective

The objective of this study is to determine:

Is there sufficient guidance to detect, and obtain a conviction for,
occupational fraud in Ireland?

This objective will be achieved by answering the following questions:
1. Is the auditing standard (ISA 240) sufficient to capture the breadth of
extant occupational fraud in Ireland?

2. Why is it difficult to bring a conviction for fraud in Ireland?

1.5

Focus of this Research

This dissertation will focus on cases of convicted occupational fraud in Ireland in
the period January 2002 to December 2013 as reported in the press. The period
chosen is post the introduction of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences)
Act 2001 in Ireland. The definition of occupational fraud used in this research is
that of abuse of a person’s position within an organisation for personal or
corporate enrichment (Zahra et al, 2007; David, 2009; Wells, 2011; ACFE, 2012)
through “misuse or misapplication of the employing organisation’s resources or
assets” (Wells J. T., 2011, p. 8). It will not include welfare fraud, insurance fraud,
marine fraud, money laundering and counterfeiting and fraud against individuals

5

or frauds committed against organisations by persons unconnected to the
organisation.

The research will replicate the work of Cohen et al. (2010) in an Irish context.
The study undertaken by Cohen et al. (2010) is discussed on pages 7 and 8. This
study will use a wider definition of fraud than that of Cohen et al. (2010). They
only examined FFR and the definition they used of fraud as stated in SAS 99 is:

“fraud is an intentional act that results in the material
misstatement in financial statements that are the subject of an
audit” SAS 99 (AICPA, 2002, Para. 5)

This dissertation reviews occupational fraud, consisting of FFR and AM in Ireland
by comparing the content of the press reports to the content of ISA 240 “The
auditor’s responsibilities relating to fraud in an audit of financial statements”
(2004), as this is the relevant auditing standard which outlines to Irish auditors the
recommended audit approach relating to fraud. Following on from the results of
this research, the difficulties in bringing a conviction for fraud are then explored.

1.6

Limitation of this Research

This exploratory descriptive research, while narrowing the existing gap in the
literature, has limitations. In fulfilment of the requirements for a Masters in
Business (Research), this dissertation was the first major piece of academic
research undertaken by the researcher. Along with experience, time was another
limiting factor for the researcher. This resulted in the time framework stopping in
December 2013. This research was undertaken by only one person, so unlike the
Cohen et al. (2010) study, there was not another researcher verifying the coding
of the categorisation of the fraudulent activities. However, every effort was made
to ensure the coding was accurate.
6

1.7

Structure of the Study

Chapters Two and Three of this study provide a thorough analysis of the extant
literature relevant to this research. Chapter Two synthesises the literature on the
definitions and characteristics of fraud. The main writers cited in this chapter are
Sutherland (1940, 1944) and Cressey (1950, 1953) as well as Brennan and
Hennessy (2001), Albrecht et al. (2004), Zahra et al. (2007), Gullkvist and Jokipii
(2013) and Dorminey et al. (2010). This chapter also reviews ISA 240 (2004) and
the fraud red-flags included there-in. This is the relevant auditing standard in
Ireland. The outcome of this chapter is to confirm the difficulties in defining fraud
and convicting for fraud that will be re-examined in an Irish context to answer one
of the questions posed in this study.

Chapter Three introduces the framework used in this study by following the
development of fraud theories from the 1950s. The main writers are Cressey
(1950, 1953), Ramamoorti (2008) and Dorminey et al. (2012) and ultimately
Cohen et al. (2010). It looks at the creation of the Fraud Triangle (FT), the
expansion, and elaboration of each of its elements, and the development of the
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). It concludes with the development of the
FT/TPB framework, by Cohen et al. (2010) which is a combination of the FT and
the TPB. This is the framework that will be used in this study.

Chapter Four describes the research strategy chosen to achieve the research
objective. It justifies the use of content analysis of press articles and lays out in
detail the steps taken by the researcher in extracting and analysing the content of
the press articles of thirty-five unique cases of occupational fraud in Ireland,
which are further analysed in Chapters Five and Six.
Chapter Five verifies the validity of the FT/TPB framework for this study. It
classifies the content of the reports of the thirty-five Irish occupational fraud cases
convicted in Ireland between 2002 and 2013. Verification is achieved by
7

classifying the data first into the three elements of the FT; incentive/pressure,
opportunity and attitude/rationalisation elements of the FT and then subclassification of the rationalisation element into the elements of the TPB; attitude
towards risk, subjective norms, perceived behavioural controls and moral
obligation. The content of the press reports of the cases fits into this framework,
deeming it valid for use in this study.

In Chapter Six the elements of the thirty-five Irish cases, as classified by the
FT/TPB framework, are compared to the examples in ISA 240, in order to
determine whether these elements are present or not in the audit standard. This
analysis will determine whether ISA 240 sufficiently covers the elements of fraud
in the extant Irish cases or not.

Chapter Seven presents the conclusion of this research by answering in detail the
two research questions of this paper. It validates many of the findings of the
extant literature in an Irish context and adds to this body of literature. It concludes
with suggestions of how its findings could be used by other researchers to provide
insight into occupational fraud.

1.8

Conclusion

This chapter introduced the background to this research. It examined the need for
research into occupational fraud in an Irish context. It stated the research
objectives, research questions and the framework that will be used. It also outlined
the limitations of the study. Chapter One concluded with an outline of the
structure of the remainder of the study, from the literature review, research
methodology, to the research undertaken, the findings, and the conclusion.

8

Chapter 2 Definition of Fraud
2.1

Introduction

This chapter commences with an introduction to fraud, it then explores the
definition of fraud, dividing extant literature into those publications that define
fraud by its characteristics and those that define it by its constituent parts. The
economic impact of fraud is examined and the criminal convictions for fraud are
then explored. This chapter provides an analysis of, and the production of a figure
depicting, the main reasons why it is difficult to bring a conviction for fraudulent
activities. It concludes with a review of the controls to prevent fraud, in particular
a description of ISA 240 “The Auditors Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an
Audit of Financial Statements” and the red-flags included therein.

2.2

Fraud is Not a New Crime

Fraud is not a new crime (Zahra et al., 2007; Dearman, 2012; Dorminey et al.,
2012). It has “existed since the beginning of commerce” (Dorminey et al., 2012, p.
556). One of the first reported instances of public company fraud was in the East
Indian Tea Company in the late 1600s (Smith, 1776; Keay, 1992; Robins, 2007).
This public company abused the powerful position granted to it by the British
government to grow the company and artificially inflate its share price.
Parliamentary inquiries into the company exposed corruption and fraud and as a
result the share price fell dramatically. Over four hundred years later, fraud is still
prevalent in commerce.

“Recently – over four centuries after the East Indian
Company introduced the concept of public ownership – we
have seen significant abuse in companies leading to largescale fraud, the bankruptcy of major companies and the
evaporation of wealth” (Albrecht et al., 2004, p.110).
9

It is only since Sutherland (1940) coined the phrase ‘white-collar crime’,
over seventy years ago, that it has been a topic of academic research.
Sutherland (1940) researched “robber barons.” The robber barons were the
owners and directors of the railroad companies of the late nineteenth century
who completed railroads “in the complete absence of any high standard of
commercial honesty” (Sutherland, 1940, p.2). This white-collar crime
occurred due to lack of knowledge by the victim (the business) of the
possibility of such a crime occurring.

“The power of the white-collar criminals is the weakness of
their victims. Consumers, investors, and stockholders are
unorganized, lack technical knowledge, and cannot protect
themselves” (Sutherland, 1940, p.9).

The term white-collar crime is now synonymous with the full range of frauds
committed by professionals.

2.3

Definition of Fraud

This section of the study first examines the literature which defines fraud by its
characteristics and then the literature that defines fraud by the type of fraudulent
activity undertaken. Even though fraud has been around since trading began, it
was not until Sutherland (1940) distinguished fraud from other crimes such as
burglary and theft, that the consideration of fraud has emerged (Dorminey et al.,
2010). Academics, however, have stressed the difficulty in defining fraud (for
example Brennan and Hennessy, 2001; Coenen, 2008; Ramamoorti et al., 2009;
Tickner, 2010; Power, 2012). Brennan and Hennessy (2001) state that

“the word ‘fraud’ is commonly used to cover a multitude of
offences which may differ markedly in size, varying from
small (e.g. false expense claims) to very large (e.g. fictitious
overseas subsidiary)” (Brennan and Hennessy, 2001, p. 57).
10

Comer (1998) suggests that fraud can be classified by definition (e.g. fraud, theft,
embezzlement), by victim (e.g. customers, creditors), by perpetrators (e.g. owners,
managers), by frequency (e.g. once off or systematic), legally (e.g. crime, tort,
contractual), by organisation (e.g. internal, external or transactional) and by the
type of fraud (concealed or unconcealed). As there is no definitive definition of
fraud, the characteristics and activities that constitute fraud will now be examined.

2.3.1 Characteristics of Fraud

At the heart of fraud are two main characteristics, namely the presence of
deception and a resultant loss from that deception (Comer, 1998; Zahra et al.,
2007; Burns, 1998; Brennan and Hennessy, 2001; Brown, 2010; Tickner, 2010;
Dearman, 2012; Power, 2012). A relevant question is “at what point does sharp
practice become fraud?” (Burns S. , 1998, p. 38). Judge Laddie in Bernasconi V
Nicholas Bennett and Co (2000) answered this question, when he stated that it
was the dishonesty factor which distinguished the act as fraud, rather than
wrongful trading. The extant literature agrees that fraud is an act committed by a
person or persons, in an abuse of power, causing a loss to, or dishonest advantage
over, another (for example Comer, 1998; Coenen, 2008; Brennan and Hennessy,
2001; Tickner, 2010; Hill, 2010; PwC, 2011).

Zahra et al. (2007) asks if fraud is always a crime. To answer this they divided
fraud into three categories: active, a crime of obedience, or a result of errors. An
individual is an “active participant” in fraud if s/he organises the fraud. When an
individual carries out an order and commits a fraud (rather than disobey an order
and suffer the consequence of disobedience), this passive acquiescence is a crime
of obedience. Finally, fraud can be a result of errors due to negligence. Even
though all three situations result in fraud (inferring that committing an error is
fraud), they are not necessarily crimes (Zahra et al., 2007).
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Others believe that it is the extent of the individual’s participation in the fraud that
determines whether or not a fraud took place. The key factor in determining
whether an action is fraud or just an error is the intention of person or persons
who commit the act of fraud (Terry, 1915; Brennan and Hennessy, 2001; PwC,
2011). In reviewing case law, Keay (2006) found that in measuring intent of a
fraudster, judges “measured what the respondent did according to the standards
of ordinary people” (Keay A. , 2006, p. 134) and that the “test for intent to
defraud is subjective and not objective” (Keay A. , 2006, p. 125). Therefore a
judgment needs to be made in each individual case of suspected fraud, as there is
no specific test or measure to establish a person’s intent and it is the law that
determines whether an action constitutes fraud (Brennan and Hennessy, 2001;
Brown, 2010).

2.3.2 Activities that Constitutes Fraud

Just as there is no conclusive definition of the characteristics of fraud, there is also
no definitive list of what constitutes fraud. The number of offences that constitute
fraud “are many and various” (Arlidge and Parry, 1985, p.3). Sutherland (1940)
lists the offences perpetrated by people convicted of white-collar crime as
misrepresentation in financial statements, bribery, embezzlement, short weights
and measurements, tax fraud and misapplication of funds in receiverships. These
offences, along with others, such as extortion, concealment of material facts and
collusion (Coenen, 2008; Brown, 2010; Hill, 2010; Lloyd, 2010) are identified as
types of fraud committed in professional literature and textbooks.

In its blog, the FBI describes the fraud carried out in Enron, ultimately resulting in
the collapse of this organisation and the demise of its auditors (Arthur Anderson)
in 2002, as follows:

“Top officials at the Houston-based company cheated
investors and enriched themselves through complex
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accounting gimmicks like overvaluing assets to boost cash
flow and earnings statements, which made the company even
more appealing to investors” (FBI, 2011)

Irish law does not have a crime named “fraud.” Instead, it refers to the concepts of
fraud and a notion of what it means to defraud someone (Criminal Justice (Theft
and Fraud Offences) Act, 2001; Brennan and Hennessy, 2001). The specific type
of offences listed in the legislation include making gains or causing loss by
deception, obtaining services by deception, unlawful use of a computer, false
accounting, suppression of documents, forgery and counterfeiting.

The issue in determining activities that constitute fraud is that:

“there is no standardisation on the categories or classification
of fraud. Different reporting bodies use different categories for
types of fraud.” (Brennan and Hennessy, 2001, p. 69).

Therefore, there is no absolute definition of fraud, no comprehensive list of
characteristics or activities, which constitute fraud. The definition of occupational
fraud that will be used in this research is when a person abuses his/her position
within an organisation for personal or corporate enrichment through Fraudulent
Financial Reporting (FFR) and Asset Misappropriation (AM).

2.4

Impact of Fraud

Sutherland (1940) believed that the cost of white-collar crimes was “probably
several times as great as the financial cost of all crimes” for an organisation
(Sutherland, 1940, pp. 4-5). He cited the case of a grocery store manager who
embezzled $600,000, which equated to six times the loss that the stores in that
grocery store chain incurred from the five hundred burglaries and robberies that
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same year. Just one such crime could cause a store to go into liquidation. Asset
Misappropriation (AM) and Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR) are major
costs for many businesses (Bierstaker et al., 2006; Wells, 2011). Ramamoorti
and Olsen (2007) confirmed that even a single fraud in an organisation could
have:

“such devastating financial consequences, including
irreparable damage, that few companies survive the crisis
unscathed.” (Ramamoorti and Olsen, 2007, p.54).

Thomas and Gibson (2003) estimated that in the USA $4,500 per employee was
lost due to on-the-job fraud. In 2010, the European edition of the Global Fraud
Survey estimated that 5% of annual revenue is lost to fraud (ACFE, 2010). In the
UK, members of CIFAS reported over two hundred and seventeen thousand
cases of fraud in the United Kingdom in 2010; they warned that “fraud rates
have surged in recent years” (CIFAS, 2011).

In Ireland Finfacts (2006) estimated that economic crime costs €1,000 per
employee. PwC (2014) in their “Economic Crime: A Persisting Threat in
Ireland” report surveyed seventy-eight Irish Companies to determine the level of
economic crime. Of the companies surveyed, 26% had been the victim of
fraudulent activity, and 50% of those affected companies suffered losses over
€75,000 in the previous year. The Gardai Recorded Crime Statistics 2007-2011
(CSO, 2013) showed an increase of 10% in “fraud, deception and related
offences” in the period 2010 to 2011 compared to those from 2007 to 2010.
While the statistics from various research and sources allocate different values to
the financial impact of fraud committed, it is clear that the financial implications
of fraud are substantial.

The current recession causes a major concern that crime, especially acquisitive
crime, will increase (Gill, 2011). In 2009, the Chief Executive of CIFAS, the
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UK’s fraud prevention service, stated “with Britain in recession, a significant rise
in fraud is inevitable” (CIFAS, 2009). However Gill (2011), who interviewed
fraudsters about their views on the notion that the recession would cause an
increase in fraud, concluded that the increase is more than likely related to more
discoveries of fraud, rather than an increase in the occurrence of fraud. Whether
due to the recession or not, fraud appears to be on the increase.

The significance of the monetary effects of fraud can have a momentously
negative impact on the results of an organisation, such as shareholders wealth
being undermined, employees losing jobs, local communities suffering due to job
losses. Fraud can also have far-reaching effects on society in general, with loss of
public confidence in the organisation, as well as leading to substantial negative
personal consequences for the executives involved (Rezaee, 2005) and often small
businesses suffer disproportionately from losses due to fraud (Glodstein, 2009).

2.5

Criminal Convictions for Fraud

Even if a fraud is uncovered, research has shown that approximately 87% of those
committing occupational fraud have never been charged with an offence and 85%
have never been punished or employment terminated by an employer for fraudrelated misconduct (ACFE, 2012). In Ireland the number of reported instances of
fraud vastly exceeds the number of convictions for this offence. The number of
reported instances of “fraud, deception and other offences” in 2013 was over five
thousand (CSO, 2014). These crime statistics cover all fraudulent crime including
welfare fraud, Ponzi schemes, identity theft, bankcard fraud, as well as
occupational fraud. However, the Irish Prison Services Annual Report (Irish
Prison Service, 2013) shows that there were less than four hundred people
committed to prison during 2013 for the category of “fraud, deception and other
offences.” On the 30th November 2013, a snap shot of the prison population
showed forty-seven prisoners categorised as serving a sentence for this category
of crimes. These prisoners account for 1% of the prison population at that date.
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Thirty six per cent of these prisoners were serving a sentence of less than one
year, with only 9% serving a sentence of more than 5 years.

The conviction figures are low given the number of organisations affected by
fraud as per the 2014 PwC survey. Along with the apparent small number of
convictions for fraud, it is estimated that 40% to 50% of organisations recover
none of their fraud related losses (ACFE, 2012).

The impact of white-collar crime, as already discussed, is far-reaching in terms of
number of organisations affected and the value of the crimes themselves, yet the
number of convictions for these crimes, from the statistics available, appears to be
low. Therefore, the fraudsters do not appear to be making restitution for their
crimes, either by repaying the organisations or by receiving custodial sanctions.
The possible reasons for the difficulties in procuring a conviction for fraud will
now be examined.

2.6

Difficulty in Convicting for Fraud

With the complexity of defining fraud, it is little wonder that there is great
difficulty proving and subsequently obtaining successful convictions for fraud.

“It has not always been possible to obtain a successful
prosecution, reflecting the difficulty in proving the elements of
the crime, including deception, obtaining advantage or the
causing of loss.” (Brennan and Hennessy, 2001, p. 82).

Professionals are slow to take responsibility for identifying or convicting
fraudsters (Power, 2012). Cited reasons for problems in convicting for fraud are
the multifarious definitions of fraud, the difficulty in detecting fraud, the status of
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the fraudster, difficulty in detecting fraud, advances in technology, law and
auditing standards not keeping pace and organisations not proceeding with
prosecutions against the fraudsters. These difficulties will now be discussed and
expanded further below.

2.6.1 Multifarious Definitions of Fraud

As already discussed, one of the possible reasons for difficulty in gaining a fraud
conviction is the wide range of offences covered under the umbrella of fraud and
the complexity of the definition of fraud.

“No one minds a straightforward theft, where it is clear what
has been stolen and who has lost it, even if you don’t
immediately know who took the cash, asset, or other item that
has been stolen. Fraud is usually more complex and most
people would prefer it was someone else’s problem.” (Tickner,
2010, p.5)

Even when reporting on an investigation in an organisation, accountants avoid the
use of the terms ‘fraud’ or ‘fraudulent’ as this “might imply fraudulent behaviour”
by a person, and “could be construed as libellous” (Brennan and Hennessy, 2001,
p. 82). The number of possible activities and the degree to which an individual is
involved in those activities make it difficult to define an action as fraud.

2.6.2 Status of the Fraudster

Up to the 1940s, criminologists and sociologists had only focused on street and
violent criminals (Dorminey et al, 2012). Sutherland (1940, 1944) noted that these
prior theories tended to use poverty as a primary reason for crime, whereas he
found that crimes perpetrated by management were rarely driven by poverty, but
by strong financial incentives. Some found that these crimes were performed by
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well-respected members of society in trusted positions in business (Sutherland,
1940; Zahra et al., 2007; Ramamoorti, 2008).

Rezaee (2002, 2005) stated that the majority of top financial statement frauds

“occur with the participation and encouragement, approval,
and knowledge of top management,” (Rezaee, 2005, p.280)

KPMG, in their report “Who is a Typical Fraudster” (KPMG, 2011), identified the
‘typical’ fraudster to be male, 36-45 years old, holding a senior management
position in a finance or finance related function, who has been employed by the
company for more than ten years and may work in collusion with another
perpetrator. Holtfreter (2005) found that individuals undertaking fraudulent
financial statements conformed to the high status, educated, male, image of whitecollar criminals. She found however that those who perpetrated asset
misappropriation or corruption were more likely to be younger and could be either
female or male and were less well educated. This supported the findings of Daly
(1989) who also found that lower level male and female workers, who do not fit
the profile of the typical fraudster mainly, carry out lower value fraud.

White-collar criminals, sometimes called “gentlemen” criminals, were thought of
as non-violent criminals (Sutherland 1950; Zahra et al., 2007), but recent research
has shown that white-collar crime can also be violent showing the same criminal
deviancy as street level criminals. This is especially the case when the criminals
are confronted with their crime – especially when they are reoffenders (Walters
and Geyer, 2004; Perri, 2011). Following on from his study of a number of fraud
cases Perri (2011) stated that white-collar criminals can even “resort to murder to
prevent their schemes from being detected and disclosed” (Perri, 2011, p. 236).
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When fraudsters occupy a position of authority they can actively discourage the
investigation of a suspected fraud by virtue of their status in the organisation
(Brown, 2010; Tickner, 2010). Where the convictions are pursued, the penalties
applied to fraudulent offences are often civil rather than criminal in nature
(Sutherland, 1940; Taylor, 2011; Brown, 2010), as other members of society are
fearful of antagonizing these professionals. Schoepfer et al. (2007) found that
public perception however is that white-collar criminals should be punished
equally as harshly as street criminals.

Therefore the position of the fraudster, generally a person in authority who is
aware of the workings of the business, and the perception that fraudsters are nonviolent, leads to an aversion to reporting of white-collar crime.

2.6.3 Difficulty in Detecting Fraud

If the fraudster is in a position of authority and has a superior technical knowledge
of the workings of a business, it is difficult to identify complex fraud (Brown,
2010; Tickner, 2010). Due to the secretive nature of the crime of fraud, and
subsequent concealment of the act by the fraudster, which involves destroying
evidence and disrupting the audit process, this makes detection and subsequent
prosecution of fraud difficult (Ramamoorti, 2008; Tickner, 2010; Chitty and
McCarthy, 2012). Zahra et al. (2007) also noted that much of fraud is uncovered
accidentally, and that even when uncovered much goes unreported.

“By nature, frauds are designed to be concealed from
outsiders. Thus identification of a fraud can be costly and the
outcome highly uncertain at the beginning of an
investigation.” (Miller, 2006, p. 1010)

Even if the action is an error, this does not mean that it is not a criminal offence
(Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act, 2001). When investigating
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cases of fraud, accountants, auditors and forensic accountants can assist in
detecting fraudulent activity, but it is only the courts that can make a legal
determination as to whether fraud has occurred (Arlidge and Parry, 1985; Brennan
and Hennessy, 2001; Auditing Practice Board, 2009). However for an
organisation following a strategy of fraud detection, rather than prevention, could
be impractical given the difficulties in detection (Wells J. T., 2004).

2.6.4 Advances in Technology

Nearly sixty years ago, Sheridan (1955) was under the impression that “the golden
age of fraud” had passed, as he believed that “modern inventions” were “unkind to
the fraud-doer” (Sheridan, 1955, p. 441). However, as many recent financial
scandals unfold, it is apparent that fraud is continuing at large levels in modern
times. In fact, the types of fraud committed have “grown in complexity and its
creativity” (Dorminey et al., 2012, p. 560). Instead of stopping the perpetration of
fraud, advances in technology have changed the ways in which fraud occurs in
business.

“The face of fraud changes as technology changes but the
basic offences remain the same” (Dearman, 2012, p.1)

Cybercrime was not on the list of types of fraud experienced by the companies
surveyed for the PwC’s Global Economic Crime Report published in 2009 (PwC,
2009). However, in its Irish Economic Crime Report in 2011, cybercrime was
reported by over 20% of the companies in Ireland and in Western Europe (PwC,
2011). It is now recorded in the top two economic crimes experienced by
companies, with more cases reported than accounting fraud or money laundering
(PwC, 2011). In its survey, cybercrime was defined as a crime where computers
or the internet play a “central role in the crime, and not an incidental one” (PwC,
2011, p. 11). Safecard.ie, an Irish organisation established to raise awareness
about the harmful effects of credit and debit card fraud, estimated that fraud losses
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on credit and debit cards in 2009 in Ireland was €16.6 million with 64% of the
frauds undertaken with the card not present (“CNP”). Where the CNP the stolen
card data is used to purchase goods over the internet, which is subsequently resold
by the thieves for cash.

It should not be assumed that cybercrime relates solely to people external to an
organisation. Haugen and Selin (1999) reported that 85 to 90% of Information
Technology (IT) frauds in their study were committed by perpetrators internal to
an organisation. Gill (2011) interviewed a fraud manager noting that technology
appears to make staff “less diligent in their own fraud prevention efforts” (Gill,
2011, p.207) and technology, due to its ability to collect such masses of data
quickly “enables fraudsters to commit crimes on a much larger scale than before”
(Gill, 2011, p.207).

2.6.5 Laws and Auditing Standards Not Keeping Pace

As a member of the European Union, the Irish auditing regulations must comply
with the Directives of the European Commission, however the national legal
system also affects the audit environment (Knechel et al, 2008). Despite the
financial impact of fraud, criminal sanctions have not been well-developed
(Ogren, 1973; Tomasic, 2011) making it difficult to bring a conviction for fraud.
Fraud prevention professionals feel that the law and law enforcement had failed to
keep pace with fraudsters (Gill, 2011). PwC (2011) noted that when a fraud is
detected a robust investigation is necessary to support disciplinary and/or legal
actions against the perpetrators. In Ireland, the last update to the law on fraud is
the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act, 2001 and as shown in
section 2.3.2 the list of activities that constitute fraud are ever expanding. ISA 240
“The Auditors responsibility relating to fraud in an audit of Financial Statements”
was published in 2004 and SAS 99 was published in the US in 2002. ISA 240 will
be discussed further in section 2.8.
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The laws on fraud have not been undated since 2001 and the auditing standards
have not been updated since 2004 and they may not be keeping up-to-date with
advances in fraud. The laws and auditing standards acknowledge the role of
management in the protection of the assets of an organisation, but management
may require assistance from auditors and other professionals in preventing and
detecting fraud.

2.6.6 Organisations Not Pursuing Cases of Fraud

Despite the availability of criminal sanctions and auditing guidelines, the level of
prosecutions in Ireland appears to be low. This seems to arise from a number of
factors. Firstly organisations don’t pursue cases against the fraudsters.

The

reasons for this vary from fear of bad publicity, the thought that internal
punishment is deemed sufficient, private settlement reached with the fraudster and
criminal action deemed too costly to pursue (ACFE, 2014). Secondly when fraud
cases are pursued it does not appear to result in many prosecutions.

In Ireland the Gardai, at the National Fraud Bureau training initiative
announcement, have reported that they are under resourced and “struggling to
keep apace of the number of offences being reported” (Brady, 2014). This lack of
resources prompted senior counsel Remy Farrell to comment that

“it was probably easier to get away with white-collar crime
now that it have ever been in the history of the state.” (Farrell,
2014)

These lack of resources were confounded in 2012 when two senior Gardai who
were in charge of the National Fraud Bureau retired (Cusack, 2012). The Director
of Corporate Enforcement only have the resources to hire two accountants to
investigate criminal charges, and one who recently retired has not been replaced
(Farrell, 2014). In Ireland that now means that
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“It is not only the regulatory bodies which have had their
capacity to investigate and prosecute white-collar offences
systematically degraded over the last few years. The Garda
Bureau of Fraud Investigations is now so under-resourced that
they are in a position to consider in detail only a small
proportion of the offences reported to them. Of those that they
are able to consider, the resources only exist to pursue
investigations in respect of an even smaller proportion still.”
(Farrell, 2014)

Wright (2006) called for fraud trials to be treated differently to other prosecutions
that are tried by jury due to the technical nature of the evidence presented and the
complexities of the evidence gathering and evidence given. She suggested that
trial by professional tribunals may lead to an increase in fraud prosecutions.

As the resources of those who are charged with prosecuting fraud are inadequate
the number of cases of white-collar crimes pursued in Ireland will remain low.
“Not only do we continue to tolerate what was euphemistically
described as 'light-touch regulation' but the very machinery of
hard regulatory enforcement has been gutted in recent years.
Not only have things not improved, they have gotten worse. As
long as that remains the case, we will live in a veritable golden
age for hucksters and fraudsters of all sorts. White-collar
crime is highly profitable and the chances of being hanged,
drawn and quartered – publicly or otherwise – are so slight as
to be insignificant. (Farrell, 2014)

Organisations not reporting or pursuing cases of fraud and Gardai being underresourced in relation to the cases which are pursued, has led to the small number
of reported prosecutions for fraud, compared to the number of reported instances.

2.7

Controls to Prevent Fraud

As the effects of fraud are significant, in order to protect the assets of the
organisation, a company needs to implement controls. Deloitte (2008) pointed out
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that an organisation’s workforce is both its greatest asset but also its “most critical
vulnerability”. They suggest that “risk is a dynamic phenomenon interacting with
potentially changing variables” (Deloitte, 2008, p.15). The equation that they
developed to assess corporate risk of fraud is:

Risk = ƒ(Vulnerability * Threat * Context * Asset Loss * Consequence)

By using this formula an organisation should be able to determine the risk that
each individual poses to the organisation, based on their vulnerability (the
characteristics and behavioural patterns of an individual), their threat to the
organisation (personal and professional pressures which impacts a person’s life or
view of themselves as competent), the context in which they work (the part of the
organisation), the assets to which they have access to (which could be
compromised if an individual wittingly or unwittingly disclosed information on,
or took action against) and the consequence of the compromising of the assets
(which can sometimes be acceptable and sometimes catastrophic). Using this
formula, an organisation can determine the amount of resources they should put
into controls in different areas of the organisation, weighting resources towards
the area where the most fiscal damage can be done.

While Deloitte (2008) risk equation offers an insight into the risks a corporation is
exposed to, it does not help to develop a plan to protect the organisation. The use
of accounting controls, improving the ethical culture of an organisation and the
proactive use of data analysis in an organisation are the most effective way to
lessen the opportunity for fraud to occur in an organisation (Brown, 2010). Lloyd
(2010) called these the control infrastructure of an organisation. Placing emphasis
on robust internal controls, good corporate governance, and the organisational
ethics would appear to be the best way for organisations to reduce the
opportunities for fraudsters (Albrecht et al., 1984; Auditing Practice Board, 2009;
Brown, 2010). The introduction of controls into an organisation is however
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expensive as additional paperwork and personnel are required. An organisation
should assess the susceptibility of assets to fraud and develop controls to protect
them. Organisations will need to consider the cost of the controls versus the
potential cost of fraud.

2.8

ISA 240 “The Auditors Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in
an Audit of Financial Statements

Since a ruling in 1896, the role of an auditor has been described as a watchdog
rather than a bloodhound (Comer, 1998; Jones, 2009). This means that the auditor
is not expected to approach their job with suspicion or an expectation of
wrongdoing on the part of clients or their employees and unless given evidence to
indicate otherwise they should accept any documents presented to them in good
faith.
“Clearly, auditing has changed considerably since 1896,
although the auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection has
remained a low priority” (Jones, 2009, p. 50).

Concern by the regulatory and accounting bodies regarding the prevalence of
fraud and the need for transparency of financial transactions led to the
development of ISA 240 (Apostolou and Crumbley, 2008).

The international auditing standard ISA 240 “The Auditors’ responsibilities
relating to fraud in an audit of Financial Statements” (2004) outlines the
responsibilities of auditors, and those charged with the governance of the
organisations’ assets in relation to fraud. It

“aims to have the auditor’s consideration of fraud seamlessly
blended into the audit process” (Ramos, 2003).
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It is the international equivalent of the US auditing standard SAS 99
“Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit” (2002). There are only
minor differences between SAS 99 and ISA 240 (Coenen, 2008) and therefore any
research into one of the standards can be applied to the other standard.

The primary responsibility for the prevention and detection of fraud still lies with
the management and those charged with governance, whereas the auditors have
secondary responsibility in this regard (Arlidge and Parry, 1985; Comer, 1998;
Jones, 2009). ISA 240 did not change the auditors duty to plan and perform an
audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are
free from material misstatement whether caused by error or fraud. However the
standards now require auditors to have professional scepticism, a partner lead
discussion of fraud assessment with all senior audit staff on an engagement, and
use of management enquiries and analytics to identify potential areas for fraud
(Casabona and Grego, 2003; Jones, 2009). An auditor should then use their
“intuition, judgment and experience to look for patterns in the identified fraud
risks” (Ramos, 2003, p. 30). When assessing risks, ISA 240 has added that the
auditor should presume there is improper revenue recognition and if none is found
then that should be documented. ISA 240 also requires an auditor to include the
risk of management override of controls as an audit risk (Ramos, 2003).

ISA 240 divides the fraud undertaken in organisations into Fraudulent Financial
Reporting (FFR) and Asset Misappropriation (AM). Sometimes FFR is considered
management fraud and AR is considered employee fraud (Gullkvist and Jokipii,
2013). Beasley et al. (1999) indicated that 90% of financial statement fraud
involved the manipulation, alteration, and falsification of financial information
with the balancing 10% involving asset misappropriation.

ISA 240 has a list of examples of fraudulent behaviour, also known as red-flags.
These are reproduced in Appendix A. The red-flag approach involves “the use of
a checklist of fraud indicators” (Bierstaker et al., 2006, p. 521). Loebbecke et al.,
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(1989) investigated auditors’ perceived importance of single red-flags by dividing
the red-flags into primary and secondary indicators. Their findings indicated the
most important red-flags were “decision making dominated by a single person”,
“poor profitability”

and “management placing undue emphasis on meeting

earnings projections” (ISA 240). Gullkvist and Jokipii (2013) surveyed internal
auditors, external auditors and economic crime investigators regarding the
importance of red-flags in alerting these professionals to the risk of fraud. The
participant groups ranked the red-flags in auditing standards in different order of
importance, however they found unethical management behaviour, cover-up of a
poor financial situation or illegal acts and a weak internal control environment to
be important accross all three groups.

Glodstein (2009) suggested focusing attention on the red-flags and educating
auditors and managers to the realities of fraud would lead to auditors asking the
right questions iincreasing prevention and detection of fraud. He also found
auditors who focus too much on the end result of the audit, the audit report and
the preparation of the financial statement, may miss some red-flags indicating
fraudulent behaviour. Skousen et al. (2009) using the red-flags in SAS 99 found
that fraud could be predicted in over 70% organisations where fraud was
subsequently reported. However heavy reliance on the red-flag (checklist)
approach in the auditing standard has been criticised (Kranacher and Stern, 2004).
The limitiations of using the red-flags approach are that red-flags may not
necessarily indicate fraud as they focus attention on particular cues, while other
indicators of fraud may be ignored (Krambia-Kardis, 2002; Bierstaker et al.,
2006; Glodstein, 2009).

For example unexplained discrepancies in the analysis of the financial data in a
company’s accounts, comparing prior year results to the present results is a redflag (Comer, 1998; Dennis, 2010). Wright and Ashton (1989) found that such
reviews signalled an indication of FFR, resulting in over half of the audit
adjustments noted in their study. However non-financial measures, such as
comparison of employee numbers to competitor or comparison of a firms
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manufacturing capacity to actual production, are not included as red-flags in the
auditing standard, and could also be used to “determine the reasonableness of
their clients’ financial statements” (Brazel et al., 2009, p. 1138).
The red-flags in ISA 240, as outlined in Appendix A, are useful for auditors but as
indicated above, over reliance on these red-flags may lead to auditors missing
fraudulent activities. This research on the other hand sets out to examine the
adequacy of these red-flags.

2.9

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the extant literature’s attempt to define fraud by its
characteristics and its constituent parts. This review illustrates that there is no
absolute definition or list of activities that constitute a fraud. This was just one of
the reasons why it is so difficult to bring a conviction for fraud. Figure 7.1 shows
the seven reasons cited in the literature for difficulty in bringing a fraud
conviction. The reasons are the multifarious definitions of fraud, the status of the
fraudster, the difficulties in detecting fraud, advances in technology, laws and
auditing standards not keeping pace, organisations not pursuing cases of fraud and
not all frauds are accidental, which will be discussed in the chapter 3. The extant
literature relating to the controls an organisation can implement to safeguard the
assets of an organisation were discussed and ISA 240 which outlines the role of
auditors relating to the detection of fraud in an audit was discussed. The
introduction of ISA 240 was to ensure the auditors consider fraud in an audit. The
auditor is now expected to consider that all documentation presented to them may
not be trustworthy. However the primary responsibility for the detection and
prevention of fraud remains with the directors and management of an
organisation. The red-flags included in ISA 240 were also discussed and were
shown to be a useful tool for auditors in detecting fraudulent activity, however it
was also shown than over reliance on red-flags can lead to auditors ignoring other
indicators of fraud. The combination of the factors discussed in this chapter has
resulted in only a small number of persons convicted of fraudulent activity held in
Irish prisons at this time.
28

Chapter 3 Frameworks for Fraud Detection
3.1

Introduction

Among the reasons given in the previous chapter for the difficulty in convicting
for fraud was the difficulty in detecting fraud. This chapter will examine the
trajectory of the framework for detecting and examining fraud from the basic
Fraud Triangle (FT) developed by Cressey (1950, 1953), together with
developments of the elements of the FT by subsequent researchers. The chapter
concludes with the combined Fraud Triangle and Theory of Planned Behaviour
(FT/TPB) framework as used by Cohen et al. (2010). The FT/TPB framework will
then be used in this study to answer the research questions posed.

3.2

Fraud Triangle (1950)

Sutherland (1940) coined the phrase “white-collar” criminals. Ten years later, his
PhD student, Cressey produced a framework that lead to the development of the
Fraud Triangle (FT). The FT is a framework used to detect and prevent fraud.
Cressey (1950, 1953) interviewed white-collar criminals to determine why they
had committed fraud. He aimed to identify the factors present when a “trust
violation” occurs but are absent when there was none. To achieve this he
interviewed inmates in the Illinois State Penitentiaries who met the broken trust
criteria and found that the “trust violation could not be attributed to a single
event” but only as a result “of a sequence of events, a process” (Cressey, 1950, p.
742). The frauds in the study, and the methods used, were diverse.

Cressey (1950, 1953) found three elements in all the frauds: perceived pressure (a
non-shareable financial problem), opportunity (an opportunity to violate their
trusted position), and rationalisation (the ability to justify the behaviour, so that in
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their mind it does not represent criminal behaviour). Having these three elements
distinguishes the action as a fraud, rather than an error.

“Trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive
of themselves as having a financial problem which is nonshareable, having the knowledge and awareness that this
problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the position
of financial trust, and are able to apply to their own conduct
in that situation verbalization which enable them to adjust
their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons with their
conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds or
property.” (Cressey, 1950, p.742).

From the work of Cressey (1950, 1950) the fraud triangle (FT) reproduced in
Figure 3.1 below was developed. It is an uncomplicated model capturing the three
elements of pressures, opportunity, and rationalisation. The FT is still widely used
today in the study, prevention, and detection of fraud (Comer, 1998; Brennan and
Hennessy, 2001; Skousen, et al., 2009; Cohen, et al., 2010).

“In a relatively simple and understandable model, Sutherland
and Cressey were able to help anti-fraud professionals
understand the motivations and actions of good people who
make bad choices.” (Dorminey et al., 2010, p. 19).

Subsequent studies of fraud cases support the existence of the three elements of
the FT (Bell and Carcello, 2000; Albrecht et al., 2004; Rezaee, 2005; Choo and
Tan, 2007). Albrecht et al. (2004) with their “Broken Trust Theory” conjectured
that pressure to commit corporate fraud and opportunities presented lead
executives to break their agency or stewardship relationship, and they
subsequently rationalise their behaviour. Rezaee (2005) reviewed five fraud cases
and found all three elements of the fraud triangle in the cases reviewed.
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Figure 3.1 - Cressey's Fraud Triangle

Pressure

The Fraud
Triangle

Opportunity

Rationalisation

Reproduced from Corporate Fraud (Brown, 2010))

Albrecht et al. (2006), using the FT, compared the elements of fraud to a fire,
where the three elements heat (perceived pressure), fuel (perceived opportunity),
and oxygen (rationalisation) need to exist, for a fire (fraud) to continue to burn.
They called this framework the “Triangle of Fraud Action.” Accordingly, the
removal of one element lets the fire die, thus if one of the elements of the fraud
triangle is removed then the fraud will not occur. These elements could also be
“what policemen and detectives have referred to as means, motives, and
opportunity” (Ramamoorti, 2008, p.525). In Choo and Tan’s (2007) American
Dream Theory, they used the three elements of the fraud triangle by using
monetary and corporate success as the pressure, with corporate executive having
the opportunities to break regulatory control, leading the executives to rationalize
and justify their actions.

Albrecht et al. (2006) reviewed the corporate bankruptcies in the US in 2002 and
noted that six of the ten largest bankruptcies, prior to that research, had taken
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place in 2002. They also noted that the majority of the bankruptcies in that year
related to financial statement and/or CEO fraud. They called this “the perfect
fraud storm” and they listed the nine elements that caused it. The elements of this
perfect storm were executive incentives, unrealistic Wall Street expectations, large
amounts of debt and greed. The good economy as a mask of many problems,
selective interpretation of rule-based accounting standards and opportunistic
behaviour of CPA firms, moral decay in society and educator failures. They also
listed these elements using the FT elements of pressures, opportunities, and
rationalisations.

Thus, research undertaken has confirmed the appropriateness of the FT as a
framework to evaluate frauds. The auditing professionals have used it as a basis
for their work in relation to fraud detection and prevention. These auditing
standards (SAS 99 and ISA 240) use the FT framework of incentive/pressure,
opportunities and attitude/rationalisation, to outline examples of behaviours that
might alert the auditor to fraudulent activity.

“According to the AICPA, only one of these factors needs to be
present in order for fraud to be committed. SAS9 requires the
auditor to apply numerous new procedures aimed at
examining the firm environment and to evaluate expansive
amounts of new information in an effort to identify facts and
circumstances that are indicative of the existence of pressures,
opportunities, and/or rationalizations.” (Skousen et al., 2009,
p. 56).

Skousen et al. (2009) used the formula
FRAUD = ƒ(Pressure, Opportunity, Rationalization)
and data from financial statements of quoted companies to test the effectiveness of
the FT and SAS 99 in detecting and predicting financial statement fraud. They
found that when using financial information for publicly quoted companies with
this formula and the examples of fraudulent behaviours included in SAS 99, fraud
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could have been predicted in over 70% of organisations where fraud was
subsequently reported.

The FT framework has been confirmed by the research. The three elements of the
Fraud Triangle (pressures, opportunities, and rationalisation) will now be
examined further.

3.2.1 Perceived Pressure

Cressey (1950, 1953) found that a perceived pressure from a non-shareable
financial problem motivated the perpetration of fraud. “Wine, women and
wagering” were the pressures outlined by Cressey (1950, p. 743). These original
pressures could be classified as financial pressures, however subsequent research
critiques this element of the FT which should contain non-financial factors as well
as financial factors. Pressures can also be classified as internal and external.

Financial pressures such as expectations to meet or beat analyst set targets (Koh et
al., 2008; Perol and Lougee, 2011) or funding requirements (Bell and Carcello,
2000; Lie, 2005; Efendi et al., 2007; Zahra et al., 2007) have led individuals to
commit fraud. Perol and Lougee (2011) found that firms reporting frauds are more
likely to have managed earnings in prior years and are more likely than non-fraud
firms to have met or exceeded analyst forecasts. Companies trying to secure lowcost external funding (Deehow et al., 1996) or new equity (Efendi et al., 2007) are
tempted to manipulate and misstate financial statements and earnings to make the
company appear more attractive to investors. Similarly, CEOs with substantial
stock options were more likely to misstate financial statements (Efendi et al.,
2007), as their wealth is a function of the stock price. Further evidence of stock
options providing an incentive to act fraudulently was provided by Lie (2005)
who found verification that hundreds of firms intentionally backdated their stock
options in order that those with options would gain financially. However,
Erickson et al. (2006) found no relationship, in the firms they examined, between
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equity incentives and the probability of the firm reporting fraudulent financial
information. Indeed Armstrong et al. (2010) found that accounting irregularities
occur less where CEOs have comparably larger levels of equity.

Agnew (1992), in an examination of cultural imbalances in crime, developed the
General Strain Theory, which suggests that a social environment where social
standing based on materiality induces behaviour to achieve material success. In
other words, when the value of an individual is based on their wealth, then the
individual will attempt to achieve, by whatever means, the wealth to maintain or
further their social standing. Paternoster and Mazerolle (1994) and Broidy (2001)
used the General Strain Theory in the context of white-collar criminals to explain
the causes of FFR, addressing the notion of pressure driven fraud. They found that
pressure to meet expectations drove the subjects to commit a fraud.

Non-financial pressures were not considered in the original FT research. However
Ramamoorti et al. (2009) used behavioural economics and psychology to
understand the motivation behind the act of fraud, and confirmed that nonfinancial reasons can also be a pressure that precipitates a fraud. They argue that
“fraud is a human act” (Ramamoorti et al., 2009, p. 21) and conclude that even if
individuals are wealthy their social status can be sufficient motivation to commit a
crime. Cases such as Madoff, Enron and Worldcom are examples where the
convicted perpetrators were motivated by their ego and sense of entitlement.

Langton and Piquero (2007) and Zahra et al. (2007) studied sociology literature to
determine whether stress or strain created by economic and social circumstances
and norms of material ambitions could explain an individual’s propensity to
indulge in criminal or fraudulent acts. They found that such strains were
positively correlated to securities violations. These findings suggest that those
who committed securities violations were of high social standing in their present
employment but appeared to have a fear of liability and unemployment strains.
For example if an executive fears a loss of a job then there is more likelihood of a
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fraud. The loss could happen from non-performance of such things as market
expectation, therefore s/he is more likely to use whatever means necessary,
including criminal violation, to meet occupational expectations, suggesting that
personal as well as organisational pressures are a factor in fraud.

A criticism of Cressey’s work is that all the non-shareable financial pressures are
internal, in that they related personally to the fraudster (Zahra et al., 2007;
Kassem and Higson, 2012) and are therefore difficult to identify. Zahra et al.
(2007) suggested that pressure could be divided into internal (personal) and
external (organisational/societal/industrial) pressures. Similarly Ramamoorti et al.
(2009) concluded that not only can the individual (Bad Apple) be under pressure
to achieve targets, but also the department (The Bad Bushel) or the organisation as
a whole (The Bad Crop) could use goals as motivation for the committing of
fraud. Therefore, along with the individual’s personal ethics, the ethical culture of
the organisation is also critical in the likelihood of fraud being committed
(Ramamoorti et al., 2009; PwC, 2011).

In order to classify the types of pressures that are likely to occur, Kranacher et al.
(2011) classified the perceived pressure element of fraud using the acronym
M.I.C.E. (M = Money, I = Ideology, C = Coercion and E = Ego / Entitlement).
The purpose of this framework was to assist investigators in identifying the
motivation of the perpetrator. Money is an obvious motivation to commit fraud,
whether it is to pay for personal debts or to gain a higher bonus by adjusting the
financial profits of an organisation (Coenen, 2008; Kranacher et al., 2011). The
non-shareable financial pressure described by Cressey (1950, 1953) did not cover
financial pressures such as stock options, bonuses and monetary incentives as they
were not as prevalent in the 1950s as they are today but the research undertaken
since then has expanded these pressures significantly. Also, as discussed earlier,
Cressey (1950, 1953), did not identify non-monetary motivations. The M.I.C.E.
framework also includes ideology, coercion, and ego. Ideology might be a less
frequent motivation for occupational fraud but examples such as tax evasion
because taxes are unfair or unconstitutional or funnelling funds to finance
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terrorism activities show that ideology can be a motivating reason. The
perpetrators believe that they are achieving some greater good (Dorminey et al.,
2010; Kranacher et al., 2011). Coercion is where the individual is unwilling but
pressurised into participation in the fraud scheme (Kranacher et al., 2011) and
equates to the Bad Bushel and Bad Crop identified by Ramamoorti et al.(2009).
Ego is where an individual believes that they are entitled to the money or the
status that they get because of the fraud being committed (Ramamorti et al., 2009;
Kranacher et al., 2011).

Kassem and Higson (2012) drew up a comprehensive list of perceived pressures
dividing them firstly between financial and non-financial pressures and then
between personal, corporate/employment and external pressures. Examples of
personal financial pressures were gambling addiction, sudden financial problems
and paying for lifestyle. Examples of non-financial personal pressures were lack
of personal discipline and greed. Examples of corporate/employment financial
pressures included continuous compensation structure, management financial
interest in the business and low salaries. Examples of corporate/employment nonfinancial pressures were unfair treatment, fear of losing job and frustration with
work or challenge to beat the system. Examples of external financial pressures
were threats to business financial stability and market expectations. Examples of
non-financial external pressures were ego, image, reputation or social pressure.
This again extended the “pressure” component of the FT.

The full list of the examples of pressures presented in ISA 240, as shown in
Appendix A, includes such examples as “financial stability or profitability is
threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating conditions”(ISA 240, p.32)
and “personal financial obligation” (ISA 240, p. 36). ISA 240 outlines that
pressures may occur internally and may also arise from outside the organisation.

The expansion of the “perceived pressure” element of Cressey’s (1950, 1953)
fraud triangle is therefore not only personal non-shareable financial pressure as
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originally suggested, but also encompasses non-financial pressures and wider
organisational and societal pressures. No matter where the perceived pressure
arises, whether it is financial or non-financial and whether it is internal or
external, when investigation of fraud takes place, the pressure is a difficult
element to identify, as it is usually internalised (Brennan and Hennessy, 2001;
Brown, 2010; Kranacher et al., 2011; Taylor, 2011).

3.2.2 Perceived Opportunity

The second element of Cressey (1950)’s fraud triangle is perceived opportunity.
The opportunity to commit fraud leads to the fraudster circumventing any of the
internal controls the organisation employs to safeguard its assets. This is the
element of the triangle that the management of the organisation has control over
and is visible to the auditors.
“As part of their anti-fraud efforts, organisations attempt to
anticipate what fraudsters might perceive and design an
environment to minimize (subject to implementation costs) the
potential for material misstatement.” (Trompeter et al., 2013,
p. 296).

Several studies review the effectiveness of internal control systems or corporate
governance to determine whether they have an effect on the likelihood of fraud
occurring. Albrecht et al. (1984) and Lloyd (2010) discussed the factors that
increase the likelihood of fraud in organisations and concluded that having an
effectual internal control structure contributes most to the minimisation of
opportunities to commit fraud in an organisation. If a fraudster does not have the
opening to commit fraud then they believed that no fraud could occur (Albrecht et
al., 2004). Loebbecke et al. (1989) surveyed audit partners with experience of
detecting financial fraud. They found that weak internal controls were the chief
condition necessary for the committing of fraud. Unsurprisingly Caplan (1999)
found that managers who wished to commit fraud prefer weak controls to enable
them to carry out the fraud.
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Rezaee (2002, 2005) developed the CRIME model an acronym of five factors
which increase the likelihood of financial statement fraud; Cooks, Recipes,
Incentives, Monitoring and End Results. The Cooks of the financial statement
fraud are those who perpetrate it. He stated that the majority of top financial
statement frauds “occur with the participation and encouragement, approval, and
knowledge of top management” (Rezaee, 2005, p.280). The Recipes of financial
statement fraud is the methodology used by the fraudster to carry out the fraud.
The Incentives of financial statement fraud equates to the pressure corner of
Cressey’s Fraud Triangle. Rezaee (2005) noted that incentives, which encourage
top executives to inflate earnings to increase their compensation packages, give
those executives the incentive to commit fraud. The fourth element is monitoring.
The rules of the stock exchange monitor publicly quoted companies. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) recognises that responsible corporate governance is
driven by the tone at the top, where high quality financial reporting and no
tolerance for misstatement are accepted.

Rezaee (2005) also found that strong audit committees overseeing the financial
reporting process and the presence of adequate and effective internal controls and
audit function was the most effective way to monitor organisations. Rezaee (2002)
suggested that by reviewing internal controls, forensically reviewing the
organisation’s records and by having vigilant corporate governance together with
vigilant audit committees and giving power to management and boards of
directors to enforce corporate objectives, organisations could minimise the
opportunities for fraud. In order words an organisation needs to place great
emphasis on the corporate governance in an organisation to minimise the risk of
fraud occurring. Abbott et al. (2004) reviewed how the audit committee
characteristics (independence, financial expertise and activity levels) affected the
likelihood of financial statements being restated. They found that occurrence of
the restatement of financial statements was negatively correlated to the activity
level and independence of the audit committee. McMullen and Omer (1996) also
found that firms with financial reporting issues were less likely to have audit
committees consisting of independent members. Deehow et al. (1996) found that
firms with less independent boards, or with the CEO as the firms’ founder, were
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more likely to manipulate earnings and less likely to have an audit committee or
shareholding held by external block holders. The implication being that ownermanaged businesses, without a non-partisan board, facilitate fraudulent activities.
Efendi et al. (2007) found executives on boards already sued for fraud to be more
likely to be sued multiple times for fraud. Based on their empirical evidence Zhao
and Chen (2008) found that boards with staggered terms (in contrast to those
whose board is elected for the entirety of a term) showed lower likelihood of
financial statement fraud, lower levels of unexpected accruals and lower firm
values, suggesting that boards with this structure have less incentive to increase
firm value or manage earnings. Collins et al. (2009) found that where the CEO
exercised greater control over the board, the prevalence of option backdating was
higher.

Coenen (2008) suggested dividing internal controls into preventative (stopping it
from happening in the first place); detective (finding fraud as soon as possible
after it happens) and corrective controls (remedy the fraud and prevent it
happening in the future). From these research findings, the role of corporate
governance and strong audit committees with autonomous members could lead to
a reduction in the opportunity available to commit fraud. The control
environment, which the fraudster exploits to commit the offence, is the observable
and most preventable element of the FT from an organisational perspective. It is
the area that companies and auditors can concentrate on in order to deter fraud, as
it is where they have maximum control over the systems of the company.

The full list of the examples of opportunities presented in ISA 240, as shown in
Appendix A, includes such examples as “accounting and information systems that
are not effective” (ISA 240, p188) and “inadequate controls over assets” (ISA
240, p190). ISA 240 outlines the importance of safeguarding assets and reducing
the opportunity to commit fraud.
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The opportunities element of the FT is the most observable and it is the element
that is under the control of those in charge of the safeguarding of assets. Measures
such as independent boards, audit committees and effective preventative, detective
and corrective internal control measures in an organisation could be implemented
to ensure the protection of the assets of an organisation.

3.2.3 Attitude/Rationalisation

The third element of the FT is rationalisation. The fraudsters need to justify their
actions to themselves and to others. Fraudsters justify fraud in their own minds
thus making it morally acceptable to themselves to commit the crime (Cressey,
1950; Coenen, 2008; Kieffer and Sloan III, 2009). The term ‘rationalisation’ is
used interchangeably with the term ‘attitude’ in much of the literature. Research
undertaken on the attitude/rationalisation element of the FT is often from
sociology and behaviour science perspectives (Hogan et al., 2008; Trompeter, et
al., 2013). Unfortunately accounting literature has given this part of the Fraud
Triangle little attention (Murphy and Dacin, 2011). Similar to the perceived
pressure element of the FT, one cannot observe rationalisation, as it is internal to
the fraudster (Dorminey et al., 2010, Albrecht et al., 1984) and therefore
inherently difficult to detect.

When Cressey questioned the fraudsters as to why they had committed fraud in
their current situation but had not exploited previous fraud opportunities, some
gave such reasons as “there was no need for it like there was this time”, “the idea
never entered my head” and “I thought it was dishonest then, but this time it did
not seem dishonest at first” (Cressey, 1950, 1953). Other ways the fraudsters have
rationalised their actions were cited as follows: “the organisation owes me”, “I
am only borrowing the money – I will pay it back” and “the company can afford
it” (Dellaportas, 2012).
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Nelson et al. (2002) said that the more imprecise the accounting standards, the
more likely it was for managers to attempt to increase earnings and also the more
likely it was for the auditors to look for restatement of the figures. With imprecise
accounting standards a fraudster can purport to follow the “rule” of the accounting
standard, rather than the intention of that standard. This is more relevant under US
GAAP, which is rule based accounting, rather than under IFRS, which apply in
Ireland, which are principal based (AICPA, 2002).

The terms rationalisation and attitude are used interchangeably in the auditing
standards (ISA 240; SAS 99) as well as in published literature. ISA 240 gives
examples such as “non-financial management’s excessive participation in or
preoccupation with the selection of accounting policies or the determination of
significant estimates” (ISA 240, p.188) or “disregard for the need for monitoring
or reducing risks related to misappropriations of asset” (ISA 240, p. 191). The
full list is included in Appendix A. ISA 240 attempts to present
attitude/rationalisation which might be observable to auditors.

Albrecht et al. (1984) found that even if the three elements of the FT did exist the
individual might not necessarily commit fraud. Therefore, they refined the fraud
triangle, replacing the rationalisation element with “personal integrity” and called
it the Fraud Scale. Accordingly, the elements they considered as most likely to
contribute to the occurrence of fraud are highly pressurized conditions, low
controls and a person of low personal integrity. They observed that inappropriate
behaviour is less likely to be rationalised by a person with high personal integrity.
Hernández and Groot (2007) also found that some of the most important factors
when assessing fraud risk in an audit are the managers’ integrity, candour, and
ethics together with concerns regarding aggressive recognition of earnings and
accounting estimates. The benefit of using personal integrity instead of
rationalisation as an element of fraud is that strong personal and corporate ethics
can be observed externally and inferred from past events, therefore increasing the
chance of detecting and thus preventing fraud occurring and reducing the risk of
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someone justifying a fraud (Rezaee and Riley, 2009; Dorminey et al., 2010; Hill,
2010).

ISA 240 recognised that pressure is both internal and external. All examples can
be seen in Appendix A but they included internal pressures such as “personal
financial obligations” (ISA 240, p190) and external pressures such as “financial
stability or profitability of threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating
condition” (ISA 240, p186).

Therefore, for a fraudster to rationalise the behaviour they have to convince
themselves and others that their personal ethics or the ethics of the business are
upheld by the committing of the fraud. However if rational judgement is
employed in any situation, this could aid in the identification of a solution to the
problem “without resorting to unlawful behaviour” (Dellaportas, 2012, p.2).

Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) also criticised Cressey’s (1950, 1953) Fraud
Triangle as missing one element necessary for a fraud to take place, capability.
They suggest that even if a situation arises where an employee has financial
pressures, the internal controls are such that the fraud can be committed and the
potential fraudster can rationalise the fraud, it is only if the individual has the
“capability” that fraud will happen. They developed the Fraud Diamond by adding
the element of “capability” to the Fraud Triangle.

Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) described how opportunity would open the door to
fraud, incentives and rationalisation will pull them closer to that door, but the
fraudster must have the capability to identify the opening and thereby walk
through the door leading to the committing and the concealing of the fraudulent
act. The potential fraudster will think:
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“I have the necessary traits and abilities to be the right
person to pull it off. I have recognised this particular fraud
opportunity and can turn it into a reality.” (Wolfe and
Hermanson, 2004, p.39).

Rationalisation is internal to the fraudster, however personal integrity can be
observed. Therefore, the individual’s capabilities should be considered.

3.3

Individuals Capabilities and Predatory Fraudsters

It has been recognised that some fraudsters just require an opportunity and that
there may be no pressure or rationalisation needed by an individual. The FT uses
the assumption that the fraudster is an accidental fraudster, meaning that s/he did
not set out to intentionally defraud the organisation when s/he began the fraud and
then as the fraud remained undetected he/she continued with the fraud (Antar,
2010; Dorminey et al., 2010 and 2012; Kranacher et al., 2011).

“Notwithstanding the fraud act, the accidental fraudster is
considered to be a good law-abiding person who under
normal circumstances would consider theft, breaking the law,
or harming others.” (Dorminey et al., 2010, p. 21)

However, predatory fraudsters do not need to rationalise their behaviour and they
may not have any financial pressures. Predatory fraudsters, or industrial
psychopaths, only need to see an opportunity to defraud a company and they will
seek it out and therefore the personal capabilities of a person should be examined
(Walters and Geyer, 2004: Wolfe and Hernanson, 2004, Perri 2004; Ramamoorti,
2008; Dorminey et al., 2010; Kranacher et al., 2011).
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“Criminals come up with excuses but they know what they’re
doing and why they’re doing it. They don’t have to do it in
most cases.” (Antar, 2010).

Keeping opportunity as a common element within the FT, Dorminey et al. (2012)
prepared a new fraud triangle to capture the essence of the predatory fraudster.
Perceived pressure is replaced by criminal mind-set and “rationalisation” is
replaced with arrogance. If one used the fraud scale as described in section 3.2,
the predatory fraudster would have low personal integrity and using the fraud
diamond as described in section 3.2.3 a predatory fraudster would have the
capability to commit the fraud. Therefore, when protecting an organisation against
fraud or investigating the possibility of fraud, consideration should be given to the
idea that not all elements of the FT are needed for a fraud to take place.

3.4

Subsequent Use of Fraud Triangle

Subsequent researchers have modified elements of the FT to improve its
effectiveness in the prevention and detection of fraud “where the fraud triangle
has fallen short” (Dorminey et al., 2010, p. 19).

As “the fraud triangle was created with the accidental fraudster in mind”
(Dorminey et al., 2010, p.21), it is not always effective in determining the actions
of a predatory fraudster or of fraud by collusion or management override (Wolfe
and Hermanson, 2004; Dorminey et al., 2010 and 2012). By using other tools
such as the Fraud Scale (as discussed in section 3.2.1), the Fraud Diamond (as
discussed in section 3.2.3) or MICE (as discussed in section 3.2.1) to investigate
fraud, audit professionals should have a better chance of detecting and preventing
both predatory and accidental fraudsters (Dorminey et al., 2012). Dorminey et al.,
(2012) considered this framework useful in extending the observable elements of
fraud, thereby improving the detectability of fraud. They see this expanded fraud
triangle as a better tool for assisting auditors, as they “will consider all the
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necessary factors contributing to the occurrence of fraud. This should help them
in effectively assessing fraud risk” (Kassem and Higson, 2012, p195).

Figure 3.2: The New Fraud Triangle Model

Motivation
(MICE
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Capabilities
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Reproduced from Kassem and Higson (2012)

The “new fraud triangle” model encompasses the subsequent research of the
elements of the fraud triangle and transforms the elements that are internal to a
fraudster and makes them observable. The observable behaviour of individuals
has also been researched in sociology literature.

3.5

Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB)

Ajzen and Fishbein (1974) sociologists developed the “Theory of Reasoned
Action” (TRA) to predict dishonest actions. Ajzen (1991) enhanced the TRA and
developed the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) to illustrate how the behaviour
of an individual is based on “three conceptually independent determinants of
intention” (Ajzen, The Theory of Planned Behaviour, 1991, p. 188); namely
attitude towards the behaviour, the subjective (societal) norms and the perceived
behavioural controls. A person will evaluate firstly their behaviour based on their
“attitude towards the behaviour,” secondly the “social pressure” to perform or not
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perform an action and thirdly the “perceived ease or difficulty of performing” the
action (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188). Beck and Ajzen (1991) added a fourth concept of
“personal feelings of moral obligation”. Any of these factors can determine
whether a person will undertake or not undertake an action. An individual is
therefore assumed to be driven by their personal beliefs, the organisational or
societal ethics, their assessment as to the likelihood of being caught and punished
for their behaviour and their moral belief system.

Predicting individuals’ behaviour using the TPB framework has been examined
and verified in many different environments such as health (Godin and Kok,
1996), electronic commerce adoption (Pavlou and Fygenson, 2006) and physical
activity (Hagger et al., 2002). Gillett and Uddin (2005) found that using the theory
of planned action explained managements’ attitudes towards fraud. Carpenter and
Reimers (2005) also found that the theory of planned behaviour could explain
fraudulent and unethical behaviour.

3.6

Combined FT/TPB Framework

Following on from the verification of the TPB framework, Cohen et al. (2010)
combined the TPB and the FT as they felt they are complementary theories, which
overlap for a number of areas of fraud. By incorporating the four concepts of the
TPB as an adjunct to the attitude/rationalisation element of fraud triangle, they
produced the FT/TPB framework (as shown in Figure 3.3).

Cohen et al. (2010) felt that by extending the rationalisation element of the fraud
triangle to include the attitude towards fraud, subjective norms, perceived
behaviour controls and moral obligation made the most unobservable element of
the fraud triangle more visible to the auditor.
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“Of these three points of the fraud triangle, this corner is
arguably the most difficult for the auditor to assess. Attitudes
and rationalizations are cognitive and therefore internal by
nature. They may be hidden or suppressed in order to
deceive. Often, the best the auditor can do is to make
inferences as to the attitudes managers may possess.” (Cohen
et al., 2010, p.273).

Cohen et al. (2010) examined press reports of thirty-nine cases of fraud in the US
that went public from 1992-2005. Unlike other researchers, they did not look to
the intention of the fraudster, but rather focused on the action of fraudsters as
reported in the press. By integrating the FT and the TPB, they analysed the reports
of fraud and cross-referenced the actual reported behaviour and attitudes to the
relevant auditing standard (SAS 99 “Consideration of Fraud”).

“It is potentially important that the professional standards
that are related to fraud detection strengthen the emphasis on
managers’ behaviour that may be associated with unethical
behaviour.” (Cohen et al., 2010, p.271)

The results of their study suggest that auditors should evaluate the ethics of
management through the assessment of attitude, subjective norms, perceived
behavioural control, and moral obligation.

“One implication from the results of our study is that auditors
should place a special emphasis on evaluating the ethics of
individuals through the assessment of attitude, subjective
norms, perceived behavioural control and moral obligationthe components of the TPB.” (Cohen et al., 2010, p.288)
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Figure 3.3 Combining the Fraud Triangle (FT) and Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB)
+
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Reproduced from Cohen et al. (2010)
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Cohen et al. (2010) also used the other elements of the FT, pressures, and
opportunities, to assess the relevance of that framework in the context of the
frauds in their study. They found that pressures and opportunities were present in
all the cases examined, however they found some of the pressures and
opportunities identified in the cases studied were not included in SAS 99.

The research undertaken by Cohen et al. (2010) was considered “novel and
unique” (Trompeter et al., 2013, p. 293). Their research noted gaps in the auditing
standards and suggested additions, especially to the attitudes/rationalisation
element of the FT by using the TPB. Cohen et al. (2010) called for research to be
undertaken in other jurisdictions, suggesting Europe in particular, using the
FT/TPB framework. This dissertation answers that call for research and, using the
FT/TPB framework, examines Irish Occupational Fraud.

3.7

Conclusion

This chapter examined the trajectory of fraud literature from the 1940s, with the
development of the Fraud Triangle, which forms the basis of subsequent theories
of fraud prevention and detection. It reviewed the research confirming the validity
of the fraud triangle. It reviewed the research on the three elements of the fraud
triangle, pressures, opportunities and rationalisation. It then reviewed frameworks
that looked to expand the fraud triangle, to further develop tools to assist those
involved in the prevention and detection of fraud. This chapter introduced the
FT/TPB framework developed by Cohen et al. (2010) whose validity was verified
by empirical evidence gathered from US fraud cases. The researcher will use this
framework in this dissertation to assess the adequacy of auditing standards in the
detection of occupational fraud.
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Chapter 4 Methodology
4.1

Introduction

This chapter defines the term research. As the research methodology is
determined by what the researcher wants to discover, this chapter sets out the
research objective and then determines the methodology to be used to answer
these questions. It begins with a broad discussion on research classification and
then focuses on the appropriate research method for this study. It describes how
the data for this study is collected, and the processes used to analyse this data. It
presents the data which will be used in the rest of this study.

4.2

Research Definitions

Research can be described as work or activities undertaken by people in a
systematic way with the aim of finding things out and increasing their knowledge
(Barrachina et al., 2004; Kumar, 2005; Saunders et al., 2011). Systematic means
that the researcher “follows a certain logical sequence” (Kumar, 2005, p.8) when
carrying out the research. Finding things out suggests that the researcher has a
clear purpose or topic that s/he wishes to find out about (Burns, 1994; Kumar,
2005; Saunders et al., 2011). As the research, methodology is determined by what
the researcher wants to find out, the first and most important step of the research
process is the formulation of the research objective (Kumar, 2005; Saunders et al.,
2011).
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4.3

Research Objective

The researcher completed a Post Graduate Diploma in Forensic Accounting in
2011. This is a qualification aimed at qualified accountants, focusing on financial
fraud and financial investigation. Following on from this, the researcher was
interested in doing a research Masters to investigate the profile of a fraudster in
Ireland. As a first step in refining the research objective, the researcher conducted
an in-depth review of extant literature in the area. According to Hakim (1987), the
literature review is:

“commonly part of the ground-clearing and preparatory work
undertaken in the initial stages of empirical research” (Hakim,
1987, p. 17).

This groundwork then provides a platform for the research (Levin, 2008).

The literature review in this instance involved searching academic journals,
books, on-line databases, the internet, technical magazine articles and conference
papers. The search terms “fraudster” and “profile of a fraudster” were used
initially. While reading the resultant literature, the researcher came across the
Cohen et al.’s (2010) article. This provided a unique framework (combining the
fraud triangle (FT) and the theory of planned behaviour (TPB)) and a research
methodology that appealed to the researcher. In their research, Cohen et al. (2010)
used the FT/TPB framework to determine whether the US auditing standard
sufficiently covered the elements of the fraud cases reported in the press. The
researcher thought that a similar study in an Irish context would be an interesting
and worthy topic of research.
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The researcher then decided to examine the literature attempting to define fraud.
Not only was it apparent that fraud is difficult to define, but it was also apparent
that the number of convictions for fraud in Ireland appears to be significantly less
than the number of apparent frauds committed. In order to determine how frauds
are studied, the progression of models and theories of fraud from the 1940s to the
present day were tracked. The auditing standard developed to assist auditors in the
detection of fraud was reviewed, with the caveat that it is not the primary
responsibility of the auditors to safeguard the assets of an organisation or to detect
fraud. The directors of a company have the main responsibility for the
safeguarding of a company’s assets. The researcher decided, based on this review
of the literature, to also explore the other reasons for the low conviction rate for
fraudulent activities in Ireland.

From reviewing the literature available, the researcher recognised a lack of
research into Irish occupational fraud. Cohen et al. (2010) called for their work to
be validated in other jurisdictions. This research will answer this calling by
replicating Cohen et al.’s work in an Irish context to determine the sufficiency of
the International auditing standard (ISA 240). The research will also use this
material to review the difficulties (or reluctances) in convicting occupational fraud
in Ireland.

The objective of this study is to examine:

Is there sufficient guidance to detect, and obtain a conviction for,
occupational fraud in Ireland?
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This research aims to achieve this objective by answering the following questions:
1. Is the auditing standard (ISA 240) sufficient to capture the breadth of
extant occupational fraud in Ireland?

This question aims to document whether the reported facts of Irish occupational
fraud cases correspond to the red-flags provided in ISA 240. The findings of this
research question will be used to make recommendations to standard setters as to
how auditing standards might be enhanced in the future.

2. Why is it difficult to bring a conviction for fraud in Ireland?

The second question aims to understand why there is a dearth of fraud convictions
in Ireland. One of the key findings of the literature review was that convictions for
fraud were difficult to pursue and the researcher aims to determine the main
reasons for this difficulty.

4.4

Research Methodology

The research method is the logic that links data to be collected (and the conclusion
to be drawn) to the initial questions of a study (Benbassat, 1987; Yin, 1989; Guba
and Lincoln, 1994; Collis and Hussey, 2009). Therefore, researchers have to allow
the particular paradigm chosen for any study to be driven by the research
questions being investigated (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The main categorisation of
research methodologies is that of qualitative and quantitative research. The choice
between qualitative and quantitative modes of enquiry depends upon the aim of
the research and the use of the findings (Kumar, 2005). Benbassat (1987) has the

54

same opinion stating that research methods are classified according to “the
question being investigated” (Benbassat, 1987, p. 48).

4.4.1 Qualitative Research Techniques

Qualitative research techniques permit the interpretation of results and allow a
creative and in-depth analysis over the course of the study. However, this can
result in the ideal of objective collection of purely descriptive ‘facts’ becoming
blurred (Adam and Healy, 2000). Qualitative research techniques are used as
exploratory methods when the variables and theory base are unknown (Morse,
1991; Creswell, 2003). According to Morse (1991):

“Characteristics of a qualitative research problem are: a) the
concept is “immature” due to a conspicuous lack of theory
and previous research; b) a notion that the available theory
may be inaccurate, inappropriate, incorrect, or biased; c) a
need exists to explore and describe the phenomena and to
develop theory; or d) the nature of the phenomenon may not be
suited to quantitative measures.” (Morse, 1991, p. 120)

In qualitative research the researcher collects data in the form of words gathered
by observations, interviews, documents, audio, visual materials and the
researcher’s impressions and reactions (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Meyer, 1997;
Creswell, 2003). Hakim (1987) states that qualitative research offers:

“richly descriptive reports of individuals’ perceptions, attitudes,
beliefs, views and feelings, the meaning and interpretations
given to events and things, as well as their behaviour.” (Hakim,
1987, p. 26)
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The data is then used to pose, refine and answer the research questions (Adam and
Healy, 2000). It involves the researcher attempting to “make sense of, or
interpret, phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them” (Denzin and
Lincoln, 1998, p. 3). It is a necessity in qualitative research that the researcher
ensures that they remain objective (Merriam, 1998). Examples of qualitative
research are content analysis, case study research, action research and
ethnography (Meyer, 1997). These are particularly applicable to exploratory
research, as exploratory research is a valuable means of finding out

“what is happening; to seek new insights; to ask questions and
to assess phenomena in a new light.” (Robson, 2002, p. 59).

This is an exploratory study, as the researcher wishes to explore a research topic
not previously examined in Ireland. The definition of fraud is non-existent in Irish
legislation and due to the impact of occupational fraud it needs to be examined indepth. This research will use content analysis to examine the words used in Irish
press reports to determine if these elements are adequately covered in the auditing
standard. However the researcher will not limit herself to qualitative analysis, she
will also quantitatively analyse the data where relevant to strengthen the findings.

4.4.2 Quantitative Research Techniques

There are those who think that when textual data is quantified the researcher’s
objective of understanding a phenomenon from the point of view of the
participants and its particular social and institutional context is lost (Meyer, 1997).
They argue that quantitative analysis is too narrow, obsessively mathematical, and
of little benefit to problems that involve complex multiple factors and uncertainty
(Hopper et al., 2001).
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However others believe that research processes that are purely qualitative can be
very unrefined and less objective than quantitative approaches (Kirk and Miller,
1998). Robson (2002) stated that there is:

“no clear and accepted set of conventions for analysis
corresponding to those observed with quantitative data.”
(Robson, 2002, p. 370).

This study is exploratory; therefore the researcher feels that in this piece of
research the quantitative analysis adds strength to the rich findings of the
qualitative analysis. A mixture of qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data
will provide insight, discovery and interpretation which are suitable to answering
the research question posed (Olson, 2004).

4.5

Content Analysis

Content analysis is a research method, which “draws inferences from data by
systematically identifying characteristics within the data” (Jones and Shoemaker,
1994). The data used in content analysis may be from primary sources such as
field notes or interview transcripts, or from secondary sources such as reports,
newspaper articles or broadcasts (Collis and Hussey, 2009). The use of secondary
data, rather than spending a lot of time collecting primary data, leaves more time
to analyse the data. A number of approaches may be used to analyse the data. The
researcher may use subjective analysis, a semi-objective approach, thematic,
meaning-orientated content analysis, readability, or linguistic analysis (Beattie et
al., 2004). The analysis enables researchers to classify content into categories and
trends from the text, and then draw inference from them (Jones and Shoemaker,
1994).
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Content analysis is usually a qualitative research method used where the
researcher is “faced with a mass of open-ended material” (Mostyn, 1985, p. 117).
When the amount of qualitative data available is unwieldy, the researcher can
either find a basis for selecting a sample, or use methods such as selecting words
or phrases, a theme or time allocated to reduce the qualitative data into coding
units (Beattie et al., 2004; Collis and Hussey, 2009). If coding units are used, a
coding frame can be constructed to incorporate the relevant data for the study
undertaken (Collis and Hussey, 2009).

“Of the semi-objective approach, some specify ex ante a
list of items and scrutinise the text for their presence,
ignoring sections of the text that do not relate to this list. It
is a fairly objective, form-oriented content-analytic
method.” (Beattie et al., 2004, p. 208)

The main advantage of content analysis is its unobtrusive characteristic.
Documents can be evaluated without the knowledge of the topic (Jones and
Shoemaker, 1994; Kababoff et al., 1995) and the subjects included in the study
are unlikely to be influenced in their behaviour (Collis and Hussey, 2009).
Another advantage is that it uses natural verbal expressions as its database. If
terms change over time, this method is adaptable in its analysis of text (Jones and
Shoemaker, 1994; Kababoff et al., 1995). A further advantage is that a systematic
and quantitative approach can be applied to qualitative data (Jones and
Shoemaker, 1994). Collis and Hussey (2009) recommend content analysis as:

“you need only select a population or sample and you
have a permanent record which can be examined many
times.” (Collis and Hussey, 2009, p. 166)
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However they also state that the main problem with content analysis is that the
method of collecting the data may be part of the analysis and it is not always
obvious how the research has “summarized hundreds of pages of qualitative data
to arrive at the findings” (Collis and Hussey, 2009, p. 163).

The research objective of this study is best fulfilled by carrying out content
analysis of press articles reporting convictions of Irish occupational fraud. The
period from January 2002 to December 2013 was chosen, as it was subsequent to
both the enactment of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud) Offences Act 2001
on the December 2001, which is the most recent fraud related legislation in
Ireland, and the introduction of ISA 240, which is the auditing standard against
which the reported facts of the cases studied, will be matched. The words used in
Irish press reports were examined to determine if these elements are adequately
covered in the auditing standard. The results will be tabulated and qualitatively
and quantitatively analysed to provide answers to the questions posed.

4.6

Selection and Analysis of Data

This study used the national newspapers and the national broadcaster as its
sources of data. These sources reported on court cases recording details of the
case, together with any relevant comments from judges and witnesses. Miller
(2006) and Dyck et al. (2010) found that the media has an important role in
monitoring accounting fraud due to the pressure it places on management. Cohen
et al. (2010) describe two key roles of the media. Firstly, in presenting
information it has received from other sources, such as auditors, analysts or
lawsuits, it attracts the attention of institutions such as regulatory bodies,
consumer groups, investment funds that may take action (Dyck et al., 2008,
Cohen et al., 2010). Secondly, the press can add new information through its own
investigations (Miller, 2006; Cohen et al., 2010). Miller (2006) states that an
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investigative report can create negative reaction in the market. This finding
suggests that the press plays an important role as a monitor or information
intermediary in financial markets. Cohen et al. (2010) also recognized that the
media may be tempted to “highlight fraudulent behaviour to increase circulation”
(p.277).

In this study, in the first instance the archive of “The Irish Times” was selected for
review, as it is the biggest selling broadsheet newspaper in Ireland. The researcher
searched the archive on a month-by-month basis, starting from February 2014 and
working backwards to January 2002, using the search term “fraud” to isolate
newspaper reports which included this word. The articles identified using the
search term “fraud” were read to determine whether they were relevant to this
study. As this research is examining occupational fraud committed by employees
or agents of companies, in order to identify the relevant articles their content was
scrutinised for relevance to this study. Cases of non-occupational fraud such as
social welfare fraud, insurance fraud, marine fraud, money laundering,
counterfeiting, or fraud against an individual were discarded. As the focus of the
study is occupational fraud prosecuted in Ireland, cases of occupational fraud
committed outside of Ireland were also discarded. Cases identified which related
to Irish companies but where the fraud was committed outside of Ireland
(Greencore – Campsie fraud in Scotland) were also discarded.

The archives of the other main broadsheets in Ireland, The Irish Independent
(www.irishindependent.ie), The Irish Examiner (www.irishexaminer.com) and the
main national broadcaster Radio Telifis Eireann (www.rte.ie) were searched to
corroborate the details of cases identified and to identify any further cases. Details
of two further cases were found using these sources, as the reports of these cases
included in the Irish Times archives included insufficient detail to enable full
analysis of the facts of the case.
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The researcher reviewed all of the articles that referred to convictions for
occupational fraud in Ireland from 2002 to 2013 and confirmed, by re-reading
them, that they were convictions under the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud)
Offences Act 2001. These cases were then re-read to confirm that they relate to
occupational fraud in Ireland in the relevant time. The result of this review formed
a full population of forty-one occupational fraud cases convicted from 1 January
2002 to 31 December 2013 and reported on in the Irish media (see Table 4.1
below).

Of the forty-one cases, there were eleven convictions where the fraudsters acted in
collusion. These frauds were targeted against five organisations (Bovale
Developments, Professional Door Staff Limited, Coca Cola/Robert Roberts, HSE
and Eircom). By combining the cases of collusion to one case of fraud against an
employer, the population of cases was reduced to thirty-five unique occupational
fraud cases for inclusion in the analysis.

The content of each of the relevant press articles was firstly categorised into the
types of fraud committed and given the code AM for asset misappropriation or
FFR for fraudulent financial reporting. Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 were produced
from this data detailing the value of each type of fraud and how it was committed.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 were later used to illustrate the multifarious ways in which
fraud can be committed.
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Table 4.1

Irish Occupational Fraud (January 2002 to December 2013) 2

Company

1 Eddie Rockets3

Name

Publication

John Carlos

Date
published

www.irishtimes.ie

04/02/2014

2

National Concert
Mary
4
Hall, Forest Tosca
O'Toole

www.irishtimes.ie

17/01/2014

3

Bovale
Development

Michael
Bailey

www.irishtimes.ie

10/12/2013

4

Bovale
Development

Thomas
Bailey

www.irishtimes.ie

10/12/2013

5 Whelan Group

Enda Whelan

www.irishexaminer.ie

20/07/2013

6 Dáil Eireann

Ivor Callely

www.irishtimes.ie

11/07/2013

7 Sunmount Services

Karl
McCaughley

www.irishtimes.ie

30/04/2013

8

Dept of Social and
Family affairs (1)

Brian King

www.irishtimes.ie

11/04/2013

9

Begley Brothers
Limited

Paul Begley

www.irishtimes.ie

10/03/2013

10

Professional Door
Staff Limited

Anthony
Malone

www.irishtimes.ie

23/02/2013

11

Professional Door
Staff Limited

Enda
O'Rafferty

www.irishtimes.ie

23/02/2013

2

Searches of the archives were undertaken in January and February 2014 and all the cases
included here were reviewed during those dates
3
This case was sentenced in 2014 but related to a conviction in 2013 so it was included in the
study
4
This case was sentenced in 2014 but related to a conviction in 2013 so it was included in the
study
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Company
Loganroy
12 Consultants
Limited
Charterhouse
13 Mortgage Centre
Limited
14 Derek Floyd

Name

Publication

Date
published

Gary Wynne

www.irishtimes.ie

14/01/2013

Gerard
Killally

www.irishtimes.ie

26/11/2012

Derek Floyd

www.irishtimes.ie

25/05/2012

15

Connolly Sellor
Geraghty

Gary Carroll

www.irishtimes.ie

20/01/2012

16

Mayo County
Council

Tom Gilboy

www.irishtimes.ie

26/11/2011

17

Dept of Social and
Family affairs (2)

Donal
McBride

www.irishtimes.ie

25/05/2011

18 FAS

James
BrookeTyrell

www.rte.ie

30/03/2011

19 AJH Construction

Alan James
Hynes

www.irishtimes.ie

01/03/2011

Chelyl
Nielsen

www.irishtimes.ie

10/02/2010

21 Bank Of Ireland (1)

Susan
Dowling

www.irishtimes.ie

23/01/2010

22 Bank Of Ireland (2)

Wiktor
Wolcaski

www.irishtimes.ie

20/10/2009

23 Vodafone

Niall Barron

www.irishtimes.ie

01/07/2009

24 Bank Of Ireland (3)

Darren
McComiskey

www.irishtimes.ie

17/03/2009

20

Ancove Enterprises
Limited

63

Company

Name

Publication

Date
published

25

Coca Cola, Robert
Roberts

Stephen
Doyle

www.irishtimes.ie

18/12/2008

26

EBS, Musgrave
C&C

Emer Kelly

www.irishtimes.ie

18/12/2008

27

Coca Cola, Robert
Roberts

Darren Cahill

www.irishtimes.ie

18/12/2008

28

Coca Cola, Robert
Roberts

David Neill

www.irishtimes.ie

18/12/2008

29

Galway County
Council

Michael Fahy www.irishtimes.ie

03/12/2008

30

Revenue
Commissioners

Michelle
Twomey

www.irishtimes.ie

05/10/2008

31 Autoglass

Claire Mahon www.irishtimes.ie

03/05/2008

32 Brown Thomas

Adam
Brennan

www.irishtimes.ie

12/03/2008

33

Celerity Fluid
Systems

Ann Levins

www.irishtimes.ie

14/10/2006

34

European
commission office

Ann Levins

www.irishtimes.ie

05/10/2006

35 HSE (1)

Cara
Canavan

www.irishtimes.ie

08/03/2006

36 HSE (2)

Abotomi L
Adedeji

www.irishtimes.ie

10/02/2006

37 HSE (2)

Olusola A
Falegan

www.irishtimes.ie

10/02/2006
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Company

Name

Publication

Date
published

38 Johnson Controls

Timothy
Elliot

www.irishtimes.ie

02/02/2005

39 Eircom

Damien
Vaughan

www.irishtimes.ie

13/11/2004

40 Eircom

Eugene
Fitzsimons

www.irishtimes.ie

13/11/2004

Irish County
Houses and
41
Restaurant
Association

Aoife Byrne

www.irishtimes.ie

27/10/2004

The next step was the extraction of the relevant content from the articles (such as
quotes from the fraudster, rulings from judges in the cases and journalists’
analyses) and the allocation of these to each of the elements of the Fraud Triangle
(pressures, opportunity and rationalisation) and the elements of the Theory of
Planned Behaviour (attitude towards fraud, subjective norms, perceived behaviour
controls, and moral obligation). The results are presented in Table 5.4. This was
subsequently used to prove that the FT/TPB model was suitable for this study.

The elements included in Table 5.4 were then further coded by examining
whether they were present or not present in the red-flags, given by way of
examples in the relevant auditing standard (ISA 240). They were coded, in the
same manner as that used by Cohen et al. (2010), by being marked as P if it was
present in ISA 240 or NP if it was not present in ISA 240. The results are
presented in Table 6.1. It is the qualitative and quantitative analysis of this data
that provides the answer to the first research question posed in this study. Table
5.4 and table 6.1 will be discussed in chapters five and six.
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The researcher completed this research of Irish occupational fraud to validate the
findings of Cohen et al. (2010) in an Irish context and to make a valuable
contribution to corporate governance and financial accounting literature in
Ireland.

4.7

Conclusion

The research objective and the resultant research questions were clarified in this
chapter. This clarification was then used to identify the research methodology to
be used. While this exploratory research is qualitative by nature, this chapter
justified the mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches applied to the data
extracted from press reports and the subsequent comparison to the red-flags
identified in the auditing standard.

Using the data identified from the content analysis, the validity of the use of the
FT/TPB framework will be tested in Chapter five and then a further analysis of
the data will provide answers to the research questions in the final chapter of this
dissertation.
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Chapter 5 Relevance of the FT/TPB Framework
5.1

Introduction

This chapter elucidates the initial part of the findings of this research. It divides
the Irish occupational fraud cases from 2002 to 2013 into two categories: Asset
Misappropriation (AM) or Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR). These are the
two categories used in both Cohen et al.’s (2010) work, which this study is
paralleling in an Irish context, and in the relevant auditing standard (ISA 240). It
then lists the methods used to commit the acts of fraud in the Irish cases.
Ultimately, it compares the elements of the Irish cases to the Fraud Triangle and
Theory of Planned Behaviour (FT/TPB) framework to determine whether it is a
relevant framework to use in this study.

5.2

Types of Occupational Fraud

The reports of the Irish press were scrutinised over a twelve year period, from
2002 to 2013, and identified thirty-five cases of occupational fraud in Ireland,
involving forty-one fraudsters. In thirty of these cases the fraudsters were
employees or directors of the organisations, in the remaining five cases the
fraudsters were contractors to the organisations. The value of the thirty-five
occupational fraud cases in this study was almost €19.3 million. These are
categorised into Asset Misappropriation and Fraudulent Financial Reporting in
Table 5.1 below. This is the categorisation used in the auditing standards and
throughout this study
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Table 5.1: Value of fraud in Irish cases from 2002-2013
Value of Fraud (€)

Type of Fraud
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR)

12,641,000

6

6,642,000

29

€19,283,000

35

Asset Misappropriation (AM)
Total

Total Cases

Of the thirty-five cases of fraud identified, twenty-nine were AM and only six
were FFR. As shown in Table 5.1 above, the twenty-nine cases of AM totalled
€6,642,000, whereas the six cases of FFR totalled €12,641,000. Even though the
number of cases of FFR is significantly lower than the cases of AM, it does need
to be analysed, as the total value of fraud by FFR is nearly twice the overall value
of the AM fraud documented.

5.2.1 Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR)

FFR is when the financial reports of the organisation are deliberately manipulated.
The methods used to perpetrate FFR in the six Irish cases are established in Table
5.2 below.

Table 5.2: Methods and Values of FFR cases
Method of FFR
PAYE/PRSI fraud
Excise Duty fraud
VAT fraud
Invoice discounting fraud
Total

Value of Fraud (€)
6,000,000
1,600,000
1,041,000
4,000,000
€12,641,000

68

Cases studied
1
1
3
1
6

Five of the six cases are due to the deliberate falsification of financial records to
reduce the tax liability of the organisation. The largest of these cases, valuing €6
million was to reduce the PAYE/PRSI payable to the revenue commissioners and
the other four were to reduce the companies’ liability of VAT. In the first case, the
directors of Bovale underestimated the gross earnings of the directors over a twoyear period, using, according to the Judge in the case, “systematic falsification" of
records. The (PricewaterhouseCoopers) PwC partner reviewing the case stated
that in his 35-year career he had “never encountered such a failure to maintain
proper books and records” (Irish Times, 10/2/13). Another FFR case is the
infamous garlic fraud case, where the director of Begley Brothers deliberately
mislabelled the import of Chinese garlic as apples to avail of a lower rate of
excise duty. In doing so, the company saved €24,000 per shipment. The overall
cost of the fraud was a €1.6 million loss to the exchequer. The sixth case of FFR
involved a director of the Whelan group falsifying the accounting records for the
purposes of invoice discounting, thereby defrauding the Bank of Scotland of €6
million. The prosecution in the case did not believe that a fraud of this scale could
be carried out over such a long period by a single director, however only one
individual was convicted in the case.

Even though there were only six convictions for FFR in Ireland between 2002 and
2013, it is the value of the fraud that is of concern here. The five tax frauds and
the invoice discounting fraud caused a substantial loss for the exchequer and the
bank involved. The six cases of FFR overall totalled €12,641,000.

5.2.2 Asset Misappropriation (AM)

In Asset Misappropriation, fraudulent measures are used to gain possession of
assets of the company. In the twenty-nine cases of AM the means of committing
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fraud varied widely, with ten different means identified by the researcher in Table
5.3 below.

Table 5.3: Methods and Values of AM cases
Cases
Value of Fraud (€)

Method of AM
False invoices
Cheque/credit card/bank transfers
Overriding IT systems
False expense/overtime claim
False revenue claims for others
Customer receipts
Unauthorised work undertaken on private
property
Cash swapped for gift cards
Forged ownership documentation
Deliberate overpayment to customer,
keeping refund
Total

Studied

4,802,000
807,000
506,000
205,000
160,000
77,000

8
8
3
3
2
1

30,000
20,000
18,000

1
1
1

17,000
€6,642,000

1
29

Eight cases of AM, representing 73% of the overall value of AM cases, involved
fraudsters submitting false invoices. One of these cases involved an employee of
Vodafone, the Financial Services Chief, submitting fictitious and inflated invoices
for services not received by Vodafone. The total value of this fraud was
€2,300,000. Another example of AM was €600,000 defrauded from FÁS by an
assistant manager of video production. He created a false tendering process,
resulting in the awarding of the contract to a company he had set up himself with
very similar names to legitimate suppliers. The contract was awarded to his
company named “The Yard Media” (the former supplier was named “Yard Media
Limited”). In that case, the judge stated that given
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“the prevalence of this type of crime, the significant breach of
trust and the very skilful sustained way [the fraudster] had
put together bogus companies and maintained the charade
for five years” (www.rte.ie , 30/3/11)

the courts need to have the full force of the law to ensure prosecution of those
who breach the trust of an employer, especially when there is no hope of
restitution. Another example involved an agent of Coca Cola and Robert Roberts
building-up a good reputation and credit history and then defrauding the
companies of €800,000.

A further eight cases, totalling almost €807,000, involved fraudsters using
company credit cards or cheques to defraud their employers. One of the cases
consisted of an employee using a credit card under the name of one of the
directors resulting in a loss of €78,000 to the company. The other six cases arose
from the fraudsters having cheques written under false pretences in their own
names and putting the suppliers name in the cheque stub or getting cheques signed
under false pretences by other employees. In a further case, a long-standing
employee of Eddie Rockets forged cheques and then, by moving the money from
one account to the other, tried to hide what he was doing.

There were three cases of fraudsters overriding IT systems resulting in total losses
of €506,000. Two of these cases took place in Bank of Ireland. In one case an
employee gave his girlfriend an unauthorised overdraft and in the other a bankteller skimmed customers’ credit cards while working at the bank counter. In the
third case of this category, an employee of the HSE knew her supervisor’s
password and authorised payments totally €146,000 to herself.
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There were also three cases of false claims for expenses or overtime. Two
politicians made false expense claims; one was convicted of submitting €15,000
false telephone invoices and the other claimed €43,000 of false travel expense
from Mayo Council. The third case of false expense claims involved a
Department of Social Affairs Senior Manager over-claiming €147,000 of
overtime, by adding his name to the end of the approved overtime lists.

In a further two cases the fraud was carried for the benefit of someone else. In one
case, a Revenue Commissioner employee gave €108,000 tax refunds to family
and friends. The other case is where two HSE employees falsely approved
€52,000 allowances for family members. In both cases the recipients had not
requested the refunds and allowances.

The five remaining cases were for smaller amounts, with one occurrence of each
type of fraud. In Ancove Enterprises Limited, the accountant kept payments
received from customers and then raised credit notes to cover the monies taken. In
another case a Galway County Councillor got council workers to undertake
€30,000 of unsanctioned work on his private property. In a further case an
employee replaced cash taken in with used gift vouchers. A director of
Charterhouse Mortgage Centre, which was in liquidation at the time of the fraud,
forged ownership documents of company assets and then removed them from the
premises. Finally a Department of Social and Family Affairs employee purposely
gave clients overpayments and then requested the overpayment to be refunded and
he kept the money received.

The multiplicity of methods used to carry out AM fraud may be one of the reasons
that it is difficult to detect. In the cases reported between 2002 and 2013 in Ireland
there were ten methods ranging from complex methods of false invoicing and
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overriding IT systems to more simple methods of false expense and overtime
claims.

5.3

FT/TPB Framework

Cohen et al. (2010), in their study of thirty-nine cases of fraudulent activity in the
US, used a FT/TPB framework (See figure 3.3), which combined the Fraud
Triangle (FT) with the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). In the FT framework
the elements of fraud are divided into incentive/pressure, opportunities and
attitude/rationalisation.

The

TPB

framework

further

divides

the

attitude/rationalisation element into attitude towards fraud, subjective norms,
perceived behaviour controls and moral obligation (see Table 5.4). Using the
FT/TPB framework, Cohen et al. (2010) compared actual reported fraudulent
behaviour in the thirty-nine US cases to the relevant auditing standard (SAS 99),
the US equivalent to ISA 240.

To determine whether the FT/TPB framework is suitable to this current study, the
Irish press reports of the thirty-five cases identified were analysed according to
the FT/TPB framework. The findings of the in-depth analysis of the press articles
of the occupational fraud cases identified are presented in Table 5.4 below. This
table categorises the reported details of the cases into incentive/pressure,
opportunities and rationalisations. The rationalisations were further analysed into
attitude toward fraud, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control and moral
obligation.
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Table 5.4: Irish Occupational Fraud (2002-2013) mapped to FT/TPB
No

Company/Date

Name

Reported

Incentive/

Opportunities

Pressure

Attitude

Subjective

Perceived

Moral

towards

norms

behaviour

Obligation

fraud

M/F

Position

Value

Age

of

control

Fraud
€’000

1

AJH Construction
(3/1/11)

A J Hynes

2

Ancove Enterprises
Ltd (10/2/10)

C Neilson

Significant
financial interest in
company and
recurring negative
cash flow
Lavish Lifestyle

3

Autoglass
(3/5/08)

C Mahon

Lavish Lifestyle

4

Bank of Ireland (1)
(23/1/10)

S Dowling

Keeping up with
peers lifestyle

False invoices
to pay less
VAT

Kept customer
payments and
raised credit
notes
Wrote cheques
to herself and
put suppliers
name on stub
Got other
departments to
write her
cheques

Minimise
earnings for
tax-motivated
reasons

Disregard for
internal
controls
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Put money
back into
the
company

M

Director

110

F

Financial
Controller

77

42

F

Clerical

99

25

F

Manager

103

37

No

Company/Date

Name

Reported

Incentive/

Opportunities

Pressure

Attitude

Subjective

Perceived

Moral

towards

norms

behaviour

Obligation

fraud

M/F

Position

Value

Age

of

control

Fraud
€’000

5

Bank of Ireland (2)
(20/10/09)

W Wolcaski

Personal Debts of
girlfriend

Gave his
girlfriend an
overdraft
facility

6

Bank of Ireland (3)
(17/3/09)

D McComiskey

Under pressure
from East European
bouncers

Skimmed
customers
card

7

Begley Brothers
Ltd
(10/3/13)

P Begley

Significant
financial interest in
company

8

Bovale
Development
(10/12/13)

M and T Bailey

Significant
financial interest in
company

Using
inappropriate
means to
reduce Excise
duty bill
Consistent and
deliberate
false
accounting

Disregard for
internal
controls and
Felt he would
only be
reprimanded

To help his
girlfriend’s
financial
position

Tried to take
sick leave
but felt
forced into it
(weak)
Minimise
earnings for
tax-motivated
reasons
Minimise
earnings for
tax-motivated
reasons

75

The Excise
duty
charge on
garlic was
excessive
To
minimise
cash
outflow

M

Clerical

40

29

M

Clerical

320

24

M

Director

1,600

147

M

Director

6,000

47
and
60

No

Company/Date

Name

Reported

Incentive/

Opportunities

Pressure

Attitude

Subjective

Perceived

Moral

towards

norms

behaviour

Obligation

fraud

M/F

Position

Value

Age

of

control

Fraud
€’000

9

Brown Thomas
(3/12/08)

A Brennan

Credit card Debt

Swapped cash
for gift
voucher
Ordered and
intercepted a
cc for director

10

Celerity Fluid
Systems
(14/10/06)

A Levis

Tarot card and
physhic line debts
and paying back
others defrauded

11

Charterhouse
Mortgage Centre
(26/11/12)

G Killally

Company had gone
into liquidation

Forged
documents to
say they
belonged to
him

12

Coca Cola/Robert
Roberts
(16/12/08)

D Neill, D
Cahill and S
Doyle

Assets sold on

False invoices
after giving
false credit
checks

13

Connolly Sellor
Geraghty
(20/1/12)

G Carroll

Gambling debt

Transferred
cash between
different
accounts

Using
proceeds to
payback
previous
victims
Made no
distinction
between
business and
personal
assets
Companies
were large so
wouldn’t be
affected

76

M

Clerical

20

26

F

Clerical

78

35

M

Director

18

42

M

Contractor

800

49,
35,
36

M

Book
keeper

261

52

No

Company/Date

Name

Reported

Incentive/

Opportunities

Pressure

Attitude

Subjective

Perceived

Moral

towards

norms

behaviour

Obligation

fraud

M/F

Position

Value

Age

of

control

Fraud
€’000

False expense
claims

Dáil Eireann
(11/7/13)
Dept. of Social and
Family Affairs (1)
(11/4/13)

I Callely
B King

Gambling debt

Overpaid
recipients, then
requested a
refund

16

Dept. of Social and
Family Affairs (2)
(25/5/11)

D McBride

Alcoholic and
Depressed

17

D Floyd
(25/5/12)

D Floyd

VAT fraud and he
got % of proceeds

Put his name
onto overtime
list after it was
approved
False invoices
for VAT claim

18

EBS, Musgraves,
C&C
(18/12/08)
Eddie Rockets
(2/4/14)

E Kelly

Asset rich, cash
poor

Cashed false
cheques

J Carlos

Gambling

Pretended he
was an
accountant and
forged signature

14
15

19

Sense of
entitlement
Increased
workload
since
recession
Disregard for
internal
controls
He felt he
was the
fall guy for
the crime
Didn’t
want to let
staff go

77

M

Politician

15

54

M

Senior
Manager

17

48

M

Senior
Manager

147

57

M

Director

680

33

F

Owner

50

42

M

Manager

135

74

No

Company/Date

Name

Reported

Incentive/

Opportunities

Pressure

Attitude

Subjective

Perceived

Moral

towards

norms

behaviour

Obligation

fraud

M/F

Position

Value

Age

of

control

Fraud
€’000

20

Eircom
(13/11/04)

D Vaughan and
E Fitzsimons

Produced false
invoices

21

European
Commission Office
(5/10/06)

A Levins

Forged
cheques and
cashed them

22

FAS
(30/3/11)

J Brooke-Tyrell

Living beyond his
means

23

Galway County
Council
(3/12/08)

M Fahy

Work carried out
on his own land

False invoices
with names
deliberately
similar to
existing
suppliers
Requested
works on his
own land

She continued
to defraud
after she was
discovered
He wished to
maintain his
lifestyle

If the
money
wasn’t
spent they
would not
be
available
next year

78

M

Managers

88

30
and
46

F

Clerical

64

35

M

Manager

600

53

M

Politician

30

57

No

Company/Date

Name

Reported

Incentive/

Opportunities

Pressure

Attitude

Subjective

Perceived

Moral

towards

norms

behaviour

Obligation

fraud

M/F

Position

Value

Age

of

control

Fraud
€’000

24

HSE (1)
(8/3/06)

C Canavan

25

HSE (2)
(10/2/06)

O Ayodele
Falegan and A
Lateef Adedeji

26

Irish Country
Houses and
Restaurant
Association
(27/10/04)
Johnson Controls
(2/2/05)

A Byrne

Depression

T Elliot

Gambling

Loganroy
Consultants Ltd
(14/1/13)

G Wynne

Significant
financial interest in
company

27
28

Lavish Lifestyles

Knew her
supervisor
password and
approved
fictional
payments
Got
allowances
and payments
for partners
Wrote cheques
to herself

F

Clerical

146

M

Clerical

52

F

Clerical

17

Created false
invoices for
payment
False invoices
for VAT claim

M

Clerical

21

40

M

Director

759

38

To reduce
VAT payment

79

33

No

Company/Date

Name

Reported

Incentive/

Opportunities

Pressure

Attitude

Subjective

Perceived

Moral

towards

norms

behaviour

Obligation

fraud

M/F

Position

Value

Age

of

control

Fraud
€’000

29
30
31

32
33

Mayo County
Council
(26/11/11)
National Concert
Hall/Forest Tosca
(17/1/14)
Professional Door
Staff Ltd
(20/7/12)

T Gilboy

Wanted to make his
wife feel better

False expenses

M O’Toole

Personal Debt

False Invoices

E O’Rafferty
and A Malone

False invoices
for VAT claim

To reduce
VAT payment

Revenue
Commissioners
(5/10/08)
Sunmount Services
Ltd
(30/4/13)

M Twomey

Significant
financial interest in
company and
recurring negative
cash flow
Gave rebates of tax
to friends

Approved
rebates

Lavish Lifestyle

Falsified sales
records

Disregard for
internal
controls
Turned up for
hearing in
new car but
not enough to
pay back

K McCaughley

Bigger fish
had gotten
away with it

80

No business
knowledge

They
didn’t ask
for rebates

M

Clerical

43

46

F

Bookkeeper

190

44

M

Directors

172

39,
37

F

Clerical

108

48

M

Agent

123

40

No

Company/Date

Name

Reported

Incentive/

Opportunities

Pressure

Attitude

Subjective

Perceived

Moral

towards

norms

behaviour

Obligation

fraud

M/F

Position

Value
of

control

Fraud
€’000

34

Vodafone
(7/1/09)

N Barron

Lavish Lifestyle

35

Whelan Group
(20/7/13)

E Whelan

Cash flow
difficulties

Requested
services from
his own
company at
inflated prices
False records
for invoice
discounting

Disregard for
internal
controls

Could not
have acted
alone

81

M

Manager

2,300

M

Director

4,000

Age

It is evident from Table 5.4 that the incentive/pressure is reported in the majority
of the case reports (thirty-one of the thirty five cases) and opportunity is reported
in all of the cases. Therefore the first two elements of the FT framework are
relevant to this study.

In relation to the attitude/rationalisation element, all of the FFR cases mentioned
an attitude/rationalisation, however it was not mentioned in eleven of the twentynine AM press reports. There are three possible reasons for this. Firstly, just
because it wasn’t in the press report does not necessarily mean that it was not
mentioned in the court cases, the press reporters may just not have found it
newsworthy. Secondly, the rationalisation is internal to the fraudster, so it may not
even have been discussed and consequently not reported in the court case.
Thirdly, two of the cases involved a number of fraudsters acting together and two
of the cases had serial fraudsters. As discussed in the literature review, this type of
fraudster may require no excuses or rationalisations to commit a fraud (Dorminey
et al., 2012). The remaining twenty-four cases had thirty-two instances of
attitude/rationalisation mentioned. These thirty-two instances were further
categorised into the four elements of the Theory of Planned Behaviour. Twenty of
the instances referred to the attitude towards fraud, three referred to subjective
norms, one to perceived behavioural controls and eight to the moral obligation
category. Therefore attitude/rationalisation, even though not included in all the
press reports, still is an important element of these cases. Overall, the contents of
the reported facts of the Irish fraud cases examined in the period 2002 to 2013 can
be readily matched to the FT/TPB framework, deeming it to be a relevant model
to use in this Irish context.
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5.4

Conclusion

This study identified thirty-five cases of occupational fraud in Ireland reported in
the press from January 2002 to December 2013. Auditing standards and the Fraud
Triangle categorise occupational fraud into Fraudulent Financial Reporting and
Asset Misappropriation. This chapter began by categorising the Irish cases in this
manner. Of the thirty-five cases of Irish fraud, six related to FFR and twenty-nine
to AM. However when the value of the fraud was calculated, it was found that the
six FFR cases result in over 66% of the total value of fraud in the eleven year
period analysed in this study, emphasising the need to examine both types of
fraud. This chapter then confirmed the multiplicity of methods used to carry out
fraud, by sub-categorising FFR and AM cases by the methods used to defraud an
employer. It found four methods of committing FFR and ten methods of
committing AM.

The content of the press reports of the thirty-five Irish cases from 2002 to 2013
were then analysed using the FT/TPB framework, to determine whether that
framework could be applied to study of Irish fraud cases. The contents of the
press reports were broken-down into incentive, opportunity and attitude towards
fraud, subjective norms, perceived behaviour controls and moral obligation. This
analysis established the relevance of the FT/TPB framework to the study of Irish
fraud as all of the elements of the FT were available in most of the cases. Using
this framework, the reported facts of the Irish occupational fraud cases will be
compared to the content of the relevant auditing standard (ISA 240), in chapter 6,
to determine the adequacy of the auditing standard in detecting fraud.
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Chapter 6 Adequacy of Auditing Standard in Ireland
6.1

Introduction

This chapter examines the adequacy of the auditing standard in detecting
occupational fraud in Ireland. The relevant auditing standard in Ireland is ISA 240
“The auditor’s responsibilities relating to fraud in an audit of financial
statements.” In this chapter, the content of the press reports of the Irish cases of
occupational fraud from 2002 to 2013 is compared to the red-flags 5 given to
auditors in ISA 240 to establish whether the auditing standard includes or does not
include examples of the elements of extant reported fraud cases in Ireland. It uses
the elements of the FT/TPB framework to make this comparison.

6.2

FT/TPB framework to assess ISA 240

As stated in Chapter 2 of this study, ISA 240 “The auditor’s responsibilities
relating to fraud in an audit of financial statements” is the auditing standard used
in Ireland to guide auditors in the detection of fraud. It splits fraud into Asset
Misappropriation (AM) and Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR). It presents red
flags, by way of examples, to guide auditors to identify behaviours and situations
which may indicate conditions where fraud has occurred or may have occurred in
each of the two categories of fraud. These examples are included in Appendix A.

In Chapter 5 of this study, the thirty-five Irish cases, as presented in the press
articles, were analysed using the FT/TPB framework, where the content of the
press reports was split into the elements of the Fraud Triangle (FT) and the
attitude/rationalisation element was further sub-divided into the elements of the
5

Auditors commonly refer to risk indicators as red-flags. These were discussed in section 2.8.
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Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). The current chapter compares that analysis
with the language and examples used in the relevant auditing standard (ISA 240).
The resulting analysis is presented in Table 6.1 below.

In Table 6.1 the columns titled “P” identify the elements reported in the Irish
fraud cases which were present in ISA 240, the columns titled “NP” identify
elements of the Irish cases of fraud which were not present in ISA 240. The
incentives/pressure elements present and not present in ISA 240 are shown in
more detail in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 respectively. The opportunities elements
present in ISA 240 are shown in more detail in Table 6.4. The
attitude/rationalisation elements present in ISA 240 are shown in more detail in
Table 6.5. Using the TPB, the attitude/rationalisation elements are further subdivided into four elements. Those elements not present in ISA 240 are represented
in Table 6.6, Table 6.7, Table 6.8 and Table 6.9.
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Table 6.1: Elements of Irish occupational fraud cases 2002 -2013 mapped to red flags in ISA 240

No.

Companies

FFR/

Incentive/

AM

Pressure

Opportunities

Attitude/rationalisation
Attitude

Subjective

Perceived

Moral

towards

Norms

behavioural

Obligatio

control

n

Fraud
P

NP

P

NP

P

NP

P

NP

P

NP

P

NP

1

AJH Construction

FFR

























2

Ancove Enterprises Ltd

AM

























3

Autoglass

AM

























4

Bank of Ireland (1)

AM

























5

Bank of Ireland (2)

AM

























6

Bank of Ireland (3)

AM

























7

Begley Brothers Ltd

FFR

























8

Bovale Development

FFR

























9

Brown Thomas

AM

























10

Celerity Fluid Systems

AM

























11

Charterhouse Mortgage Centre

AM

























12

Coca Cola/Robert Roberts

AM
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No.

Companies

FFR/

Incentive/

AM

Pressure

Opportunities

Attitude/rationalisation
Attitude

Subjective

Perceived

Moral

towards

Norms

behavioural

Obligatio

control

n

Fraud
P

NP

P

NP

P

NP

P

NP

P

NP

P

NP

13

Connolly Sellor Geraghty

AM

























14

Dáil Eireann

AM

























15

Dept. of Social and Family Affairs (1)

AM

























16

Dept. of Social and Family Affairs (2)

AM

























17

D Floyd

AM

























18

EBS, Musgrave, C&C

AM

























19

Eddie Rockets

AM

























20

Eircom

AM

























21

European Commission Office

AM

























22

FAS

AM

























23

Galway County Council

AM

























24

HSE (1)

AM

























25

HSE (2)

AM

























26

Irish Country Houses and Restaurant Assoc.

AM
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No.

Companies

FFR/

Incentive/

AM

Pressure

Opportunities

Attitude/rationalisation
Attitude

Subjective

Perceived

Moral

towards

Norms

behavioural

Obligatio

control

n

Fraud
P

NP

P

NP

P

NP

P

NP

P

NP

P

NP

27

Johnson Controls

AM

























28

Loganroy Consultants Ltd

FFR

























29

Mayo County Council

AM

























30

National Concert Hall/Forest Tosca

AM

























31

Professional Door Staff Ltd

FFR

























32

Revenue Commissioners

AM

























33

Sunmount Services Ltd

AM

























34

Vodafone

AM

























35

Whelan Group

FFR

























TOTAL

AM 29

15

16

35

0

13

6

0

2

0

2

0

8

FFR 6

Key:

AM = Asset Misappropriation

FFR = False Financial Reporting

P = Present in Auditing Standards (ISA 240)

NP = Not Present in Auditing Standards (ISA 240)
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6.3

“Incentive/pressure” in ISA 240

Thirty-one of the thirty-five Irish fraud cases from 2002 to 2013 had the
incentive/pressure element of the case reported in the press. When comparing this
element of these thirty-one cases to the examples given in the auditing standard, it
was found that fifteen cases reported pressures which were present in ISA 240
(see Table 6.2 below) and the remaining sixteen reported pressures which were
not present in ISA 240 (see Table 6.3 below).

Table 6.2: Incentive/pressure present in ISA 240
Element
the

of Red Flags as presented in ISA 240

Companies Involved

Fraud

Triangle
Incentive/

Significant financial interest in the entity

pressure (FFR)

AJH Construction , Begley
Brothers Ltd, Bovale
Development, Loganroy
Consultants Ltd

Recurring negative cash flows from AJH Construction ,
operations or an inability to generate cash Professional Door Staff
flows from operations while reporting Limited, Whelan Group
earnings and earnings growth
Incentive/

Personal financial obligations

pressure (AM)

Brown Thomas, Celerity
Fluid Systems, Connolly
Sellor Geraghty, Dept of
Social and Family Affairs
(1), EBS/Musgrave/C&C,
Eddie Rockets, Johnson
controls, National Concert
Hall/Forest Tosca

Adverse relationship between entity and

Charterhouse Mortgage

employees with access to assets (layoffs)

Centre Limited
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Of the thirty-one cases, six were FFR cases and twenty-five were AM cases. The
pressure element of all six of the FFR cases examined were present in two of the
examples given in ISA 240, with one of the cases citing both examples as
pressures. In four of the cases those convicted of the fraud were owner/managers
of the business defrauded and therefore had what is described in ISA 240 as a
“significant financial interest in the entity” (ISA 240). The second pressure cited
in three of the cases could be described as experiencing “recurring negative cash
flows” (ISA 240). These two pressures from ISA 240 are sufficient to cover all of
the incentive/pressure from the Irish FFR cases.

The incentive/pressure reported in nine of the twenty-five AM cases is also
present in two of the examples given in the relevant auditing standard. The first
risk factor identified in the cases examined which is present in ISA 240 is
personal financial obligations which “may create pressure on management or
employees with access to cash or other assets susceptible to theft to appropriate
those assets” (ISA 240). In eight of the cases, the fraudster had personal financial
obligations. These obligations ranged from gambling debts, large mortgage
repayments and debts from tarot reading and phychic lines as well as having to
pay back previously defrauded employers. The second incentive/pressure in one
of cases examined, which is present in ISA 240, is where there is an “adverse
relationships between the entity and employees” where there was “known or
anticipated future employee layoffs” (ISA 240). In the case reported, the director
of the company was aware that the company was going into liquidation, and he
then defrauded the company by forging asset ownership documents.

In sixteen reported cases of AM in Ireland the incentive/pressure identified in the
press reports was not present in ISA 240. This study classifies incentive/pressure
into five categories: lavish lifestyle, pressure from criminals, greed, depression
and concern for others (see Table 6.3 below).
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Table 6.3: Incentive/pressure not present in ISA240
Elements of the Examples NOT present in Companies involved
Fraud Triangle

ISA 240

Incentive/pressure Lavish Lifestyle

Ancove Enterprises

(AR)

Limited, Autoglass, Bank
of Ireland (1), Bank of
Ireland (2), FAS, Galway
County Council, HSE (1),
Sunmount Services,
Vodafone

Pressure from criminals

Bank of Ireland (3)

Greed

Coca Cola/Robert
Roberts, D Floyd

Depression

Dept of Social and Family
Affairs (1), Irish Country
Houses and Restaurant
Association

Concern for others

Bank of Ireland (2), Mayo
County Council, Revenue
Commissioners

In nine cases, the perpetrators had a lavish lifestyle that they wished to maintain.
The researcher believes that this is beyond the scope of the pressure of personal
financial obligations used in ISA 240. For example in one case “there was no
excuse or desperation for funds, it was simply to lead a high life” (Irish Times
23/01/10). The fraudster had “a swish peer group” but also had “a serious
cocaine habit” (Irish Times 23/01/10). In another case it was noted that the
fraudster "enjoyed a very affluent lifestyle" (Irish Times 30/04/13). Another
fraudster “squandered money living the high life” (Irish Times 10/02/10). In
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another case, an Eastern European bouncer, already convicted for other criminal
offences, became aware that one of his customers worked in a bank. He threatened
this customer into carrying out a skimming fraud. This pressure from criminals is
not present in ISA 240. Another of the incentive/pressure not present in ISA 240
was greed as was seen in the case where Floyd got his customers to invest in a
product and then defrauded the business of part of the proceeds. In the Coca
Cola/Robert Roberts, the company agents sold assets which they had
misappropriated. In two cases the incentive/pressure stated in the press reports
was depression. One of these fraudsters was considered to be “a person of
impeccable character” (Irish Times 25/05/11), while the other fraudster was said
to be in a severe state of depression when she undertook a “schematic fraud”
(Irish Times 27/10/04) on her employers. In a further three cases the
incentive/pressure was concern for others. These concerns included wanting to
make a family and loved ones feel better, even though in none of the cases was it
reported that these family and friends requested the perpetration of the fraud. The
three cases involved giving unauthorised tax allowances and unauthorised
overdraft and giving the fraudster and his wife an unauthorised trip to cheer her
up.

The examples given in ISA 240 were sufficient to cover all of the pressures
reported in the FFR cases, but while ISA 240 does include a number of examples
of pressures that auditors should look out for in AM cases, there is still a number
of incentive/pressure found in the Irish cases which are not included. The findings
of this research recommend that the examples given in ISA 240 should be
extended to include additional elements such as lavish lifestyle, pressure from
criminals, greed, depression and concern for others.

6.4

“Opportunities” in ISA 240

The opportunity element as reported by the press in all thirty-five Irish cases is
present in the examples given in ISA 240. This is encouraging and perhaps not
surprising as from the organisations point of view the opportunities part of the FT
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is the element over which it has control. If the opportunity is not there, then a
fraud cannot take place. However, fraud does take place because sometimes the
cost of having controls is greater than the perceived costs of potential fraud, or the
organisation is so small that the control of segregation of duties is not possible.
These are all present in the auditing standard.

In all six FFR cases the opportunity reported was present in one of the examples
given in ISA 240 (see Table 6.4). There was what ISA 240 describes as
“domination of management by a single person without compensating controls”
(ISA 240) with all of the fraudsters in the Irish cases being the owner or director
of the organisation involved.

Similarly, in the AM cases, all twenty-nine of the opportunities cited in press
reports are also present in the auditing standard (see Table 6.4). They are
represented in five of the examples. One of the red flags of ISA 240 is the
opportunity that exists due to having “large amounts of cash on hand or
processed” (ISA 240). This was present in the case where an employee was in
charge of giving the cash to the security company and noticed that the security
company staff had dropped an envelope of gift vouchers. The employee then
began to swap gift vouchers for cash. Another red flag in ISA 240 is “inadequate
internal control over assets” (ISA 240). This red flag is present in two of the AM
cases. In the first case, a director falsified documentation to claim ownership of
company assets when the company went into liquidation. In the second case, the
manager ordered assets for the company but took possession of them himself and
sold them on. In both these cases there would appear to have been inadequate
control over the physical ownership of the assets. There have also been cases
where management have what was described by ISA 240 as “inadequate
oversight” (ISA 240) of expenses.
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Table 6.4: Opportunities present in ISA 240
Element
the

of Red Flags as presented in Companies Involved

Fraud ISA 240

Triangle
Opportunities

Domination of management by a

AJH Construction, Begley Brothers Ltd,

(FFR)

single person without

Bovale Development, Loganroy Consultants

compensating controls

Limited, Professional Door Staff Limited,
Whelan Group

Opportunities

Large amounts of cash on hand or

(AM)

processed

Brown Thomas

Inadequate internal control over

Charterhouse Mortgage Centre Limited,

assets

Eircom

Inadequate oversight of senior

Dail Eireann, Dept. of Social and Family

management expenditure, such as

Affairs (2), Galway County Council, Mayo

travel and other re-imbursements

County Council

Inadequate system of

Autoglass, , Coca Cola/Robert Roberts,

authorization and approval of

EBS/Musgrave/C and C, Eddie Rockets,

transactions

European Commission Office, FAS, HSE
(2), Irish Country Houses and Restaurants
Association, National Concert Hall/Forest
Tosca, Johnson Controls, Revenue
Commissioners,

Inadequate segregation of duties

Ancove Enterprises Limited, Bank of

and independent checks

Ireland (1), Celerity Fluid Systems,
Connolly Sellor Geraghty, Dept. of Social
and Family Affairs (1), D Floyd, European
Commission Office, Irish Country Houses
and Restaurants Association, National
Concert Hall/Forest Tosca, Sunmount
Services, Vodafone

Inadequate management

Bank of Ireland (2), Bank of Ireland (3),

understanding of information

HSE (1)

technology
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The four instances of inadequate oversight of expenses included submissions of
expenses for work done on personal property, false telephone invoices, a false
expense claim and a false overtime claim. ISA 240 also describes how an
organisation could have an “inadequate system of authorization and approval of
transactions” (ISA 240). Examples of such inadequacies in the Irish cases were
that of an employee writing cheques to herself and then filling in supplier names
in the stub or of an employee getting other departments to write them cheques. In
another three cases, customer receipts were lodged into the fraudsters’ personal
accounts. These breaches of control systems could also be categorised as
“inadequate segregation of duties and independent checks” (ISA 240). Due to the
nature and size of some of the companies involved in the study “inadequate
segregation of duties and independent checks” (ISA 240) may be inevitable. This
was reported in eleven of the Irish cases in this study. As more systems become
computerised, Information Technology (IT) control systems in a business become
increasingly important. ISA 240 includes as one of the opportunities for fraud the
“inadequate management understanding of information technology” (ISA 240).
This existed in three the Irish cases studied. One where the fraudster had the
opportunity to use the IT system to give his girlfriend an overdraft facility (Bank
of Ireland (2)), another to skim customer cards (Bank of Ireland (3)) and, a third
using an observation of a supervisors password, which was subsequently used to
approve fictional transactions entered on the accounting system (HSE (1)).

The opportunities reported in all thirty-five of the Irish cases of fraud between
2002 and 2013 were present in the ISA 240. As the opportunities element of the
FT is the element that would be most visible and controllable by the companies, it
is not surprising that opportunities to commit fraud are adequately covered by ISA
240.

6.5

“Attitude/rationalisation” in ISA 240

The rationalisation element of a fraud is not always included in the media
coverage. In eleven of the thirty-five Irish cases, no rationalisation was included
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in the press report. On the other hand, six cases reported multiple rationalisations
of fraud. Thirty-one instances of attitude/rationalisation were found in the twentyfour cases for which it was reported. Ten of the thirty-one instances reported were
in five of the FFR cases and the remaining twenty-two instances were in nineteen
AM cases.

Utilising the TPB to further subdivide the rationalisation element of the cases into
the following four sub-categories:
1. Attitude towards fraud.
2. Subjective norms.
3. Perceived behavioural control.
4. Moral obligation.
It was found that all of the rationalisations in the cases that are also present in ISA
240 come under the heading of attitude towards fraud (see Table 6.5). None of the
elements found in the other three headings were present in ISA 240

6.5.1 Attitude towards Fraud in ISA 240

Attitude towards fraud refers to the extent to which a person has a favourable or
unfavourable evaluation of the behaviour in question. If a person deems the
behaviour acceptable then they are more likely to engage in it. Attitude towards
fraud was mentioned in the press reports of nineteen of the Irish cases. Of these
nineteen cases only thirteen were present in five of the examples given in ISA 240
(see Table 6.5 below). Of these thirteen cases, five were FFR and eight were AM.

In the five FFR cases the attitude towards fraud reported was present in two of the
examples given in ISA 240 (see Table 6.5). All five cases reported “an interest by
management in employing inappropriate means to minimise reported earnings for
tax-motivated reasons” (ISA240). The cases included under-declaration of sales
or over-declaration of purchases to reduce VAT and Excise payments and the
under-statement of gross remuneration of the company directors to reduce tax.
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Two of these cases also reported that “the owner-manager makes no distinction
between personal and business transactions” (ISA 240). In one case, the
company directors took more income from the company than recorded in the
accounts and in the other case the owner/manager of the business felt that the
company’s assets belonged to him. This example was also used as a
rationalisation in an AM case, where the VAT liability was under-declared, and
the resulting extra revenue for the company was ploughed back into the business
to purchase equipment. ISA 240 could use this rationalisation under AM, as well
as FFR.

In six of the eight AR cases where the attitude towards fraud reported was present
in the auditing standard, the fraudsters used a “disregard for internal controls
over misappropriation of assets or failing to correct known internal control” (ISA
240) as a rationalisation for committing fraud (see Table 6.5). These cases
involved the employee knowingly targeting poor controls, for example by
authorising an overdraft or expense claims or overriding the physical ownership
of assets. In one reported case the fraudster showed “behaviour indicating
displeasure or dissatisfaction with the entity or its treatment of the employee”
(ISA 240). He felt overworked and undercompensated for the extra workload. In
relation to the rationalisation of “changes in behaviour or lifestyle that may
indicate assets have been misappropriated” (ISA 240). In the fraud case
involving FÁS the following was reported:

“The court heard (the fraudster), who was on a salary of
€50,000 a year, was living a lifestyle that could not have been
supported by his salary. He spent the money on foreign trips,
home improvements and driving a better car. There is no money
left, the court heard and FÁS remains out of pocket” (www.rte.ie
30/03/11).
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Table 6.5: Attitude towards Fraud present in ISA 240
Element of the Fraud Red Flags as presented in Companies Involved
Triangle

ISA 240

Attitudes/Rationalisation

An interest by management in

AJH Construction, Begley

(FFR)

employing inappropriate means

Brothers Limited, Bovale

to minimise reported earnings

Development, Loganroy

for tax-motivated reasons

Consultants Limited,
Professional Door Staff
Limited

The owner-manager makes no

AJH Construction, Bovale

distinction between personal and

Development, Charterhouse

business transactions

Mortgage Centre (AM)

Attitudes/Rationalisation

Disregard for internal controls

Bank of Ireland (1),Bank of

(AM)

over misappropriation of assets

Ireland (2), Charterhouse

or failing to correct known

Mortgage Centre Limited, ,

internal controls

Dept. of Social and Family
Affairs (2), Revenue
Commissioners, Vodafone

Behaviour indicating displeasure

Department of Social and

or dissatisfaction with the entity

Family Affairs (1)

or its treatment of the employee

Changes in behaviour or

FAS

lifestyle that may indicate assets
have been misappropriated

There were six AM cases where the attitude towards fraud was not present in ISA
240. This study classifies the attitude towards fraud in these six cases into two
categories not included in the auditing standard; sense of entitlement and no
apparent regard for the crime committed by showing no remorse (see Table 6.6
below).
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In the Dáil Eireann case where a senator falsely claimed phone expenses, a sense
of entitlement was reported.
“This is not a case of a simple mistake or indeed
overstretching boundaries,” the judge said. “Politicians
are not expected to be superhuman; they are entitled to
get it wrong. But politicians are not expected to cut
corners and rely on entitlement for explaining
misbehaviour or indeed criminal acts.” (Irish Times
28/07/14)
This sense of entitlement was not present in ISA 240.
Table 6.6: Attitude towards Fraud not present in ISA 240
Element of the Theory Examples NOT present Companies Involved
of Planned Behaviour

in ISA 240

Attitude towards fraud

Sense of Entitlement

Dáil Eireann

No apparent regard for

Bank of Ireland (2),

crime committed

Coca Cola/Robert
Roberts, European
Commission, Mayo
County Council,
Sunmount Services

In five AM cases, the fraudster appeared to have no regard for the crime
committed. In one case the fraudster continued to defraud the organisation even
after the fraud had been initially discovered and in the other case the fraudster
apologised for the crime but he made little attempt to pay back the money owed
and attended the court hearing in a new car. In the third case, the agents felt that
the fraud would not hurt the companies as they were large companies, even
though in this case the losses severely negatively affected one of the companies
defrauded and it had to cease trading. In two cases the fraudsters appeared to
diminish the seriousness of the fraud. In one case the employee was discovered to
be falsely claiming travel expenses but felt that “bigger fish had gotten away with
greater crimes” (Irish Times 26/11/11). In the other case the fraudster felt the
fraud was facilitated by a gap in procedure and therefore only warranted a
reprimand.
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The examples given in ISA 240 were not sufficient to cover all of the attitudes
towards fraud reported in the AM cases. The findings of this research advise that
the examples given in ISA 240 should be extended to include a sense of
entitlement and no apparent regard for the crime. These attitude/rationalisation
show the fraudsters to neither understand nor care for the implications of the
frauds on others, and these types of attitudes should be red-flags to auditors if they
discover such attitudes on an audit.

6.5.2 Subjective Norms in ISA 240

Subjective norms are where the belief that those who are important to you,
including colleagues, would approve or disapprove of the fraud behaviour. The
two cases where subjective norms were identified involved the fraudsters alluding
to others (who were not convicted) as complicit in the fraud. These are shown in
Table 6.7.This is not present in ISA 240.

Table 6.7: Subjective Norms not present in ISA 240
Element of the Theory Examples NOT present Companies Involved
of Planned Behaviour

in ISA 240

Subjective norms

Complicity in

Whelan Group, D Floyd

undertaking the fraud

In the FFR case where fraudulent accounts receivable details were used to get
invoice discounting, the judge felt that the fraudster could not have acted alone
and more senior members of staff must have been involved. However, no other
convictions were made in this case. In another case the fraudster believed he was
the “fall guy for more sinister elements who benefitted from the [fraudulent]
scheme” (Irish Times 25/05/12). These subjective norms were not present in ISA
240 and the researcher advises that the examples given in the standard should be
extended to include them. Where there is complicity in the undertaking of a fraud,
this makes it more difficult for an auditor to discover, as there is more than one
person involved in the cover up of the crime.
100

6.5.3 Perceived Behavioural Controls in ISA 240

Perceived behaviour control relates to the experience of a person and anticipation
of impediments and obstacles based on their experience, competence and any
expected obstacles they might face. Perceived behavioural controls generally
relate to influence over the person by another. Two cases had a perceived
behavioural control reported in the press and this was not present in ISA 240 (see
Table 6.8).

Table 6.8: Perceived Behavioural Controls not present in ISA 240
Element of the Theory Examples NOT present Companies Involved
of Planned Behaviour
Perceived
controls

in ISA 240

behavioural Weak Personality/easily Bank of Ireland (3)
lead

Lack

of

business Professional Door Staff

knowledge

Limited

In one case a bank employee tried to take sick leave rather than carry out the
fraud, however he was a "very weak individual who is easily lead" (Irish Times
17/3/09) and he let himself be pressurised by criminal elements. Both the attitudes
towards fraud and the perceived behaviour control elements indicate examples
where the fraud may have been a deliberate act from the start and the character of
the employee is in question. In the final case, the directors claimed that their lack
of business knowledge, and therefore an inability to keep proper books and
records, was the reason for the fraud. Normally it is assumed that the fraud begins
accidentally however the character of the employee and their excusing fraudulent
behaviour should also be included in ISA 240.
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6.5.4 Moral Obligations in ISA 240

Moral obligation is where behaviour is considered ethical and moral by the
fraudsters in the circumstance, for example fraudsters can lessen their feeling of
guilt if they believe their actions are helping others. The eight instances of moral
obligation identified in this study, as divided in this study into three categories,
were not present in any of the examples given by ISA 240 (see Table 6.9 below).

Table 6.9: Moral Obligations not present in ISA 240
Element of the Theory

Examples NOT present

Companies Involved

of Planned Behaviour

in ISA 240

Moral obligation

Action for the good of

AJH Construction,

the company/department

Begley Brothers Limited,
Bovale Development,
Galway County Council,

Charitable actions : for

Bank of Ireland (2),

the good of others

EBS/Musgrave/C&C,
Revenue Commissioners

To pay back previous

Celerity Fluid Systems,

frauds

In eight reported cases the fraudsters manipulated the system and committed a
fraud as they believed the action was for the good of their department, their
company or of others. There were four cases of action for the good of the
company/department where the directors felt they were performing the taxation
fraud for the benefit of the company and not for themselves. In one case all of the
money in the VAT fraud was invested back into the business. In the fourth case a
councillor, who got council staff to work on his own property, rationalised the
behaviour by stating it was to maintain the council’s budget in future years. In
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three cases the fraudster undertook the fraud for the good of others. In one such
case the fraudster stated that she was not even aware that she was acting illegally
when she gave extra tax credits to friends. In another case the fraudster owned her
own company, which was failing and she did not wish to leave her staff go. In
another case the fraudster wanted to give one friend an increase in their tax
allowances and another friend an overdraft and in another the fraudster didn’t
want her own staff to lose their jobs. In the final fraud case, the fraudster used the
proceeds of a fraud to repay another employer who she had previously defrauded.
Undertaking a fraud for the benefit of the company or undertaking fraud as a
charitable act or carrying out a fraud to pay back others were not present in ISA
240.

There are no examples of moral obligation present in ISA 240. The auditing
standard needs to be more comprehensive and expanded to include examples
where the fraud is carried out to help the organisation and others or to pay back
for previous frauds committed as determined from this research. When a fraudster
believes that they are undertaking a fraud for the benefit of the company or of
others then it will be more difficult to convince the fraudster of the act undertaken
as being wrong.

6.6

Conclusion

This chapter compared the content of the press reports of occupational fraud in
Ireland from 2002 to 2013 to the examples of red-flags presented in ISA 240. It
found although the “opportunities” element of fraud is adequately covered in ISA
240 at present, the “pressures” and “attitude/rationalisation” elements are not.
Five additions to incentive/pressure in the auditing standard were recommended
based on the findings of the current study. These are: a lavish lifestyle, pressure
from criminals, greed, depression and concern for others.
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The findings suggested that the elements of the TPB framework should be used to
expand the examples given for the attitude/rationalisation element. Under
“attitude towards fraud” it is recommended that examples of sense of entitlement
and no apparent regard for the crime committed be added. Under “subjective
norms,” it recommended that an example where the fraudster considers that others
would approve of the fraud should be included in the auditing standard. The
perceived behavioural control of a weak personality should also be included in the
auditing standard. Moral obligations, where the fraudster considers the fraud to be
carried out to help the organisation or others or to repay previous frauds, should
also be included as an example in the auditing standard.

If these suggestions are included in the auditing standards, the ability of the
auditing standards to detect extant Irish occupational fraud could be significantly
improved. The awareness of these examples to auditing professionals and the
management of organisations could encourage them to notice attitudes and traits
in employees which may suggest fraudulent activity. The more cases are taken
against occupational fraudsters, the more incentive/pressure, opportunities and
attitude/rationalisation of fraudsters will be revealed.
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Chapter 7 Conclusions of this Research
7.1

Introduction

Cohen et al. (2010) used a FT/TPB framework, combining the Fraud Triangle (FT)
and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), to examine the unethical behaviour of
managers from 1992-2005 in thirty-nine reported fraud cases in the US. They
suggested that SAS 996 the auditing standard in the US, could be strengthened by the
inclusion of additional examples of fraud risk factors identified from their research.
They called for similar research in other jurisdictions. This study is an answer to this
calling, to substantiate the findings of Cohen et al. (2010) in an Irish context, and also
to examine why conviction rates are low in Ireland.

The objective of this study is:

Is there sufficient guidance to detect, and obtain a conviction for, occupational
fraud in Ireland?

This objective will be achieved by answering the following questions in this chapter:
1. Is the auditing standard (ISA 240) sufficient to capture the breadth of extant
occupational fraud in Ireland?
2. Why is it difficult to bring a conviction for fraud in Ireland?

To answer these questions, the researcher used content analysis of the press articles
reporting occupational fraud in the twelve year period from January 2002 and
December 2013. This period was used as it is followed the introduction of the
Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. This chapter closes with a
discussion of the limitation of this research and recommendations for future research.

As previously stated the US stated the equivalent of ISA 240 is SAS 99 “Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit.” There are only minor differences in the text of the two auditing standards.
6
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7.2

Sufficiency of ISA 240

This section analyses the content of the press reports and the auditing standard to
answer the first research question posed.

Question 1:

Is the auditing standard (ISA 240) sufficient to capture the
breadth of extant occupational fraud in Ireland?

The majority of the reported incidents of fraud in Ireland were relatable to the FT/TPB
framework. Of the thirty-five cases examined, thirty-one provided at least one
“incentive/pressure” on the fraudster that could have led to the committing of the
fraud in the press reports. It should be noted that the press reports were made by court
reporters and the lack of reporting of an incentive/pressure does not mean that they did
not exist, just that perhaps this aspect was not worthy of reporting. The “opportunity”
to commit fraud was in the press reports of all thirty-five cases in this study. As noted
in the literature review, opportunities for fraud occur when there is a lack of internal
control. This is the element of the fraud triangle over which the company should have
control.

Twenty-four

of

the

thirty-five

cases

studied

had

at

least

one

“attitude/rationalisation” included in the press report. A number of the twenty-four
cases reported multiple rationalisations that lead to thirty-one instances of
rationalisations in the study. Using the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) the
“attitude/rationalisation” element is divided into four categories; “attitude towards
fraud”, “subjective norms”, “perceived behavioural controls” and “moral
obligation”, provides more insight into the rationalisation of fraud. In this study there
were nineteen instances of “attitude towards fraud”, two of “subjective norms”, two of
“perceived behavioural controls” and eight instances of “moral obligations.” Three
potential reasons for the non-recording of attitude/rationalisation in the press reports
could be that the press reporter simply did not think it newsworthy, it is internal to the
fraudster so it may not have been discussed in the court case or if the person were a
serial fraudster, he/she would require no rationalisation to undertake the fraudulent
action.
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ISA 240 “The Auditors responsibilities relating to fraud in an audit of financial
statements” is the auditing standard used by auditors in Ireland to get guidance on the
detection of fraud. It suggests red flags, by way of examples, that auditors may face in
a broad range of situations, to fulfil their duty in an audit of financial statements.

When comparing the elements of the FT/TPB framework reported in the press reports
of the Irish occupational fraud cases to the examples given in ISA 240, it was found
that some of the elements were not present in the auditing standard. This confirms in
an Irish context the findings of Cohen et al. (2010) that the existing auditing standard
needs to be expanded. Of the thirty-five Irish cases examined only seventeen reported
an incentive/pressure which is presented in ISA 240, all thirty-five recorded
opportunities were present in ISA 240, and only thirteen of twenty-four cases which
recorded attitude/rationalisation could be matched to the examples given in ISA 240.
The elements that were present in the auditing standard are summarised in Appendix B
to this study. It should be noted that the elements of some of the cases could be
matched to multiple examples presented in ISA 240. However, more interestingly for
this study, it is apparent that some of the elements of the Irish cases were not present
in the auditing standard. Table 7.1 presents the additional examples that should be
added to the existing auditing standard to improve it adequacy. As not all instances of
fraud are captured in the red-flags as presented in the ISA 240, this also confirms the
findings of Krambia-Kardis, 2002 Bierstaker et al., 2006 and Glodstein, 2009, who
warn against over reliance on red-flags, which could lead to the ignoring of other
indicators of fraud.
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Table 7.1

Recommended additions to ISA 240

Element of the FT/TPB

Not present in ISA 240

Incentives/pressurea

Attitudes/rationalisations
(Reasons
fraudsters)

given

by

1.

Lavish lifestyle (PIC)

2.

Greed

3.

Pressure from criminals

4.

Depression

5.

Concern for others (PIC)

6.

Paying back others previously defrauded

Attitude towards Fraud
the

1. Sense of entitlement
2. No apparent regards for crime concerned to make
amends

Subjective Norms
3. Complicity in undertaking the fraud (PIC)

Perceived Behavioural Controls
4. Weak personality/easily lead (PIC)
5. Lack of business knowledge

Moral Obligation
6. Action for the good of the company/department
7. Charitable actions : for the good of others (PIC)
8. To pay back previous frauds
Key – PIC – Present in the research compiled by Cohen et al. (2010)
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7.2.1 Additional Incentives/Pressures

This study confirms that two further examples of the incentives/ pressures that
Cohen et al. (2010) suggested should be added to the US auditing standard, could
also be added to ISA 240. The first is “maintenance of a high standard of living.”
This was present in nine of the thirty-six Irish fraud cases. In ISA 240 the risk
factor “personal financial obligations” is used, which suggests the fraudster is
motivated to cover financial debts or losses incurred. “Maintenance of a high
standard of living” would not necessarily be included in this, as it is a situation
where the fraudsters make a choice to live beyond their means. These results
confirm the results of Paternoster and Mazerolle (1994) and Broidy (2001) A
further incentive/pressure noted by Cohen et al. (2010), and confirmed by this
study, is “charitable causes/helping others”. This was reported in three of the Irish
cases where fraud was committed to help others, sometimes without the
knowledge of the other person.

As well as confirming the need to add these two incentive/pressure, this study
found three further incentive/pressure, which were not present in ISA 240 (or in
Cohen et al.’s (2010) findings). They are “greed,” “pressure from criminals” and
“depression.” The FT and ISA 240 are predicated on the belief that fraud starts by
accident and it then become habitual. However, in two of the Irish cases examined
the only motivating factor reported for fraudsters committing fraud was greed. In
another case a fraudster was put under pressure from criminals to carry out fraud
against the company in which he worked. In two cases, the fraudsters’ depression
was the reason given for committing the fraud. Accordingly, as well as Cohen et
al.’s (2010) two additions, these three additions would improve how
representative the auditing standard is of the extant incentive/pressure in an Irish
context.

Three additional incentive/pressure identified by Cohen et al. (2010), namely
“reputation at stake,” “influence of managers on others” and “prize given” were
not found in any of the Irish cases. All of the cases in Cohen et al.’s (2010) study
involved Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR) in large listed organisations where
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stock options and managerial bonuses were of concern. Whereas in this study of
thirty-five Irish occupational fraud cases, only six involved FFR and it was mainly
in owner-managed or small to medium enterprises (SMEs). The issue of share
price was therefore irrelevant in the Irish cases. Even though these additions are
not found in the extant Irish fraud cases, they should be taken into consideration if
the auditing standard is to be reviewed.

7.2.2 Opportunity

Similar to the findings of Cohen et al. (2010), all opportunities reported in this
study were present in ISA 240. As stated earlier, the cases examined by Cohen et
al. (2010) were large quoted companies and the frauds were undertaken by senior
management. The opportunities identified by Cohen et al. (2010), which were not
seen in the cases in this study, included significant related party transactions, an
ability to dominate industry, highly complex transactions and ineffective boards
of management and audit committees. This study only shares one of the
opportunities found in Cohen et al.’s (2010) study, that of “domination of
management by a single person or a small group without compensating controls”
(ISA 240). This was the opportunity present in all the FFR cases of this study. The
opportunities in this study found in the AM cases were “large amounts of cash”,
“inadequate internal controls”, ”inadequate oversight of senior management of
expenditure”, “inadequate segregation of duties”, “inadequate system of
authorisation and approval” and “inadequate management understanding of
information technology” (ISA240). The auditing standard has adequately covered
all of the opportunities reported in the Irish cases in this study.

7.2.3 Additional Attitudes/Rationalisations

Cohen et al. (2010) used the TPB to expand the attitude/rationalisation element
of fraud cases to include attitude towards fraud, subjective norms, perceived
behaviour controls and moral obligations to identify elements not present in the
auditing standard. A similar analysis was conducted as part of the study.
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Under “attitude towards fraud,” Cohen et al. (2010) identified two
rationalisations of fraud not present in the US auditing standard. Those were
“maintaining a high living standard” and “reputation at stake.” “Reputation at
stake” was not found in the Irish cases. “Maintaining a high living standard” was
found, but the researcher felt it was more appropriate to include this as an
incentive/pressure, rather than being seen as an attitude towards fraud. This study
identifies a further two attitudes towards fraud as suggested additions to the
auditing standard: a sense of entitlement and no apparent regard for crime
committed. In the case of a politician convicted of submitting fraudulent
expenses, the judge felt the fraudster conveyed a sense of entitlement by assuming
that just because these expenses were sanctioned, he should get them. No apparent
regard for the crime committed was reported in five of the cases. In one of these
cases the fraudster felt the companies were large and could afford the loss, and
another fraudster continued committing fraud even after it was discovered. One of
the fraudsters turned up to court in a brand new car having made no attempt at
restitution, one of the fraudsters felt that others who had carried out more
“serious” crimes had gone unpunished and finally one of the fraudsters believed
that his crime did not warrant much punishment.

Under “subjective norms” Cohen et al. (2010) identified “influence of
management” and “complicity” as two suggested additions to the US auditing
standard. The “influence of managers” was not found in the current study,
however the requirement of an addition of an example of “complicity” was
confirmed in six of the Irish cases. In four reported cases more than one fraudster
was convicted. In the other two cases an accomplice was alluded to, but only one
fraudster was convicted.

Under “perceived behavioural controls” Cohen et al. (2010) suggested two
additions to the auditing standard. These were “receiving a prize or superlative”
and “the personality of the manager.” There were no extant Irish cases of
receiving a prize or superlatives in the cases examined in the current study. This
study does suggest however that “personality” should be added to the auditing
standard, especially if it was weak and the person could be easily influenced. In
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one case the judge stated that the fraudster had a weak personality based on the
fact that he allowed himself to be influenced by criminals. This study also
suggested the inclusion of “no business knowledge” as an addition to the auditing
standard. This was present in a case where the directors used their lack of business
knowledge as a rationale for carrying out the fraud.

Under “moral obligation” Cohen et al. (2010) identified “actions for the good of
the company” as a rationalisation which was in the US cases but not present in the
relevant auditing standard. This study confirmed that this was also used as a
rationalisation in four of the study cases where fraud was carried out for the good
of the company. In one case, the fraudster ploughed the proceeds of the fraud back
into the business. In two cases the tax (excise duty and PAYE/PRSI) was thought
to be unjust. In the final case the fraudster suggested that the council would get a
smaller budget next year if the fraud was not committed. Cohen et al. (2010) also
identified “charitable causes” as a rationalisation not present in the auditing
standards. This was identified in three Irish cases in this study, where the fraud
did not benefit the fraudster, but benefitted family and friends by way of tax
allowances and authorising an overdraft. This was not present in ISA 240. As well
as recommending the addition of these two as examples in ISA 240, an additional
rationalisation of moral obligations was found in this study, where the fraudster
rationalised the fraud as the money was used to repay a previous fraud.

The auditing standard already provides many red flags for an auditor to consider.
As not all of the elements of these cases are covered by the examples given in the
auditing standard, the findings of this study suggest that the standard should be
expanded to provide a more comprehensive list of examples. It suggests the
addition of maintenance of lavish lifestyles, charitable causes, greed, pressure
from criminals and depression in the incentives for committing fraud. It suggests
the addition of a sense of entitlement, no apparent regard for crime, complicity,
weak personality, no business knowledge, actions for the good of the company,
charitable causes and repayment of previous frauds as examples of rationalisation
of fraud (see Appendix C). Some of these were confirmation of the findings of
Cohen et al. (2010) and others are further examples identified by the researcher in
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this study. Undeniably, it would be very difficult to provide an exhaustive list of
all circumstances under which fraud is undertaken, but by using the FT/TPB
framework a number of new examples are suggested here that cover the extant
Irish cases over the twelve year study period and since the new laws were
introduced in 2001.

7.3

Difficulties in Bringing a Conviction for Fraud in Ireland

This section used the analysis of the extant press report to answer the second
research question posed.

Question 2:

Why is it difficult to bring a conviction for fraud in Ireland?

The extant literature discussed a number of difficulties in identifying and
convicting fraud cases as depicted in Figure 7.1. The main reasons identified in
the literature review for these difficulties were; multifarious definitions of fraud;
status of the fraudster; difficulty to detect; advances in technology, law and
auditing standards not keeping pace, organisations not pursuing cases of fraud and
not all frauds are accidental.

This study confirms the difficulty recounted in extant literature of the multifarious
definitions and methods of fraud. This study using the auditing standard’s
categorisation of occupational fraud into Fraudulent Financial Reporting (FFR)
and Asset Misappropriation (AM), divided the thirty-five cases in this study into
six FFR and twenty-nine AM cases. Even though only six of the thirty-five cases
studied were FFR, the total value of these cases was 66% of the value of the
frauds committed. These findings support the findings of Beasley et al. (1999)
who found the value of FFR greatly exceeded that of AR.

There were fourteen methods of fraudulent activity, four FFR, and ten AM. These
methods ranged from fraudulent taxation return, false invoicing, false expense and
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overtime claim to forging ownership documentation. The number of different
methods used to defraud in the cases examined illustrates the multifarious
definitions and methods of fraud. This study only looked at occupational fraud so
frauds such as identity theft, card skimming and false representation were not
examined.

Figure 7.1

Difficulties in convicting fraud in the current study
Multifarious
definitions and
methods
Predatory
fraudsters

Organisations not
pursuing cases of
fraud

Status of the
Fraudster

Difficulties
in
convicting
fraud

Laws and
auditing
standards not
keeping pace

Difficult to
detect

Advances in
technology

The proposition in the extant literature that a fraudster is likely to be of high status
in the company and to be in top management is borne out in this research.
Because of their seniority in the organisation, others in the company may not
report suspected fraud for fear of retribution. All the FFR cases in the study were
carried out by company directors. The majority of the AR cases were also carried
out by senior management. The vast majority of the Irish cases involved small to
medium sized owner-managed businesses and would not have audit committees as
prescribed by best corporate governance practice. The one on top is very
important in these organisations. If it appears that management are partaking in, or
lenient on fraudulent activity, then the other employees may feel that fraudulent
activity is acceptable.
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The extant literature emphasised that the secretive nature of fraud often makes it
difficult to detect. Even if a company knows that funds are gone, it is often
difficult to detect and quantify the value of the fraud. In this study, the method of
detecting fraud was mentioned in seventeen press reports, see table 7.1 below.

Table 7.2:

Method of fraud detection noted in Irish fraud cases

Detection Method
Not Reported
Internal controls
Suppliers complaint
Whistle-blower
Tax Audit (threat)
IT System
Reporter
External Audit
Grand Total

Value of Fraud
€

Number of
Cases

14,984,615
3,252,385
600,000
224,000
135,000
40,000
30,000
17,000
€19,283,000

18
10
1
2
1
1
1
1
35

An internal control was the method of detection recorded in ten of the cases. In
two frauds uncovered by internal controls new personnel in a department noticed
anomalies and investigated the source. In another case, the fraudster was receiving
exceptionally high levels of overtime. In another case, the fraud was detected
when a manager noticed that the takings for the night for one section of the
business consisted of just vouchers with no cash. In another case, the management
was concerned that the revenue from a section had fallen and looked for it to be
investigated by an external auditor. In one case, a supplier was no longer getting
contracts and wanted an explanation. In two cases a whistle-blower made a
complaint, one came as a tip off from a previous co-worker and the other was a
man who found cheques with the company name in his daughter-in-law’s house.
In one case, a notice of a tax audit prompted the fraudster to confess. In the case
of an employee who gave his girlfriend an unauthorised overdraft, the company’s
IT system flagged this as an unusual transaction. A freedom of information (FOI)
request by a reporter caused the fraud to be uncovered in the case of the councillor
who had council employees carry out work on his property. In only one case,
where the fraudster stole a cheque book, was the fraud uncovered by an external
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auditor. In the cases of FFR, the fraud was undertaken by the directors/owners of
the businesses who were in a position to override the internal controls of the
organisations. Although it was not reported, it is most likely that these were
uncovered by a Revenue Commissioner investigation. ISA 240 reiterates that it is
the directors of a company that are primarily responsible for the safeguarding of
assets of the company and that the auditor only has secondary responsibility and it
is not expected that an audit would detect fraud.

The methods used for undertaking the frauds are included in tables 5.2 and 5.3.
The specific use of technology was not recorded in the press reports of the cases
but technology was used in the cases of the unauthorised overdraft limit given to a
girlfriend, the use of a supervisors’ password to authorise payments and
unauthorised transfers to the fraudsters accounts. The subject of this research,
occupational fraud cases, would not cover any outside cyber-attacks. The use of
technology should be an important part of efforts to detect and protect from fraud.

Difficulties in securing a conviction for fraud could also be due to the fact that the
law and auditing standards are not keeping pace with advances in methodologies
of committing fraud. The law in relation to fraud in Ireland has not been amended
since 2001 and ISA 240 has been in place since 2004. The auditing standards
should be reviewed to include the elements of the TPB framework and include the
examples of fraudulent behaviour noted in the Irish cases studied, that are not
included in ISA 240.

Eircom is the only Irish Public Limited Company (PLC) in which an occupational
fraud case was identified for this study. As noted in Chapter four, Greencore PLC
did prosecute a case of occupational fraud, however this was pursued in Scotland
so this was not included in this study. The Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners (2014) noted the reasons for non-pursuit of fraudsters vary from fear of
bad publicity, internal punishment deemed sufficient, private settlement reached
with the fraudster and criminal action deemed too costly to pursue.
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The prosecution of fraud cases appears to be inadequate. There were two press
reports of cases not included in this study where civil cases had been taken against
fraudsters, instead of criminal cases, as the time taken by the Gardaí to bring a
criminal case was deemed too long. These cases were not included in the study as
the outcome of the cases was not publically recorded. It is difficult to know if
these are the only cases. The Anglo Irish Bank collapsed in 2007 and the first
attempted prosecutions did not take place until 2014. The Gardaí and the Director
of Corporate Enforcement have reported that they do not have the technical skills
or the resources to investigate fraud (Brady, 2014). In two of the cases examined
the fraud was undertaken by serial fraudsters who were only pursued after they
had defrauded a number of employers. Perhaps if organisations took a zero
tolerance policy and pursued prosecutions the cost of fraud might reduce.

The capability of the fraudsters is another difficulty encountered when looking for
a fraud conviction. Sutherland (1940) and Cressey (1950) assumed that the fraud
begins when the fraudster has an un-shareable financial obligation. In the original
FT it is expected that fraud is carried out in the first instance by accident with
more recent research exploring the concept of the predatory fraudster. Predatory
fraudsters only need opportunity to commit a fraud (Walters and Geyer, 2004;
Wolfe and Hernanson, 2004, Perri, 2004; Dorminey et al., 2010; Kransher et al.,
2011). The researcher believes that there was a serial fraudster, who perpetrated
fraud on a number of organisations, in two of the cases in this study. One of the
fraudsters committed fraud against two organisations and the other targeted three
employers. There were also a number of cases in the study where fraud was
committed through collusion. Most of the fraud theories and the auditing
standards are based on a fraudster working alone and the fraud had not been
started deliberately. The auditing standard should be expanded to include
instances of the predatory fraudster and of collusion.

The inadequacy of the auditing standard is not the only reason why the number of
convictions for occupational fraud is low. This study finds the multifarious
methods of committing fraud, the status of the fraudster, difficulties in detecting
fraud, advances in technology, law not keeping pace, reluctance by organisations
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to report fraud, and that predatory fraudsters target organisations and therefore not
all frauds are accidental, as factors keeping the conviction rate for occupational
fraud so low in Ireland.

7.4

Limitations of this Research

This exploratory descriptive research, while narrowing the existing gap in the
literature, has limitations. In fulfilment of the requirements for a Masters in
Business (Research), this dissertation was the first major piece of academic
research undertaken by the researcher. Along with experience, time was another
limiting factor for the researcher. This resulted in the time framework stopping in
December 2013. This research was undertaken by one person, so unlike the Cohen
et al. (2010) study, there was not another researcher verifying the coding of the
categorisation of the fraudulent activities. However in Cohen et al. (2010) the
second researcher did not find significant errors in the coding of the original
researcher, so it is unlikely that this was a factor in the current study.

The research was undertaken using newspaper articles reporting on occupational
fraud. Newspapers may wish to sensationalise fraud cases and create dramatic
stories to boost circulation. However, the press articles were based on court
proceedings and were based on facts and testimonials presented in the cases and
judges’ comments. In this study care was taken to focus on the facts of the case
and ignore journalistic opinions. While the reports of the cases used are from
court proceedings the elements of incentive/pressure and attitude/rationalisation
were not included in all of the reports and the findings of the research could have
been expanded had this information been available. The number of occupational
fraud cases identified in the research was thirty-five, but it must be noted that the
press may not have reported all cases of occupational fraud convicted in Ireland
during the time researched.

118

7.5

Future Research

This research answered the call of Cohen et al. (2010) to extend the scope of their
study to investigate cases of fraud using the FT/TPB framework in territories
outside of the US. It confirmed the findings of their study that further examples of
red flags should be added to the auditing standards, particularly through expansion
of the attitudes/rationalisation element of the auditing standards to include attitude
towards fraud, subjective norms, perceived behavioural controls and moral
obligation. It would be interesting to compare these findings with other territories
such as the UK or other European countries. In addition, a longitudinal study
could be undertaken to examine the content of press reports of Irish fraud cases in
ten years’ time to determine if any new elements would be identified, perhaps
relating to advances in technology and cybercrime.

None of the Irish occupational fraud cases identified in this research were of fraud
in Irish PLC’s. It would be interesting to investigate the reason for this. The small
number of cases identified in the research would suggest that there are only
limited amounts of fraud cases pursued through the legal system. The reason for
this perceived lack of prosecution could also be investigated.

Another area for further research could be the methods of discovering fraud as
there was only limited reporting of these in the press reports. As the most
significant suggested additions to the auditing standard relate to the
attitudes/rationalisation section of the audit triangle further research could be
undertaken to assess the auditor’s view of the usefulness of the FT/TPB
framework.
Another area for further research could be the lack of resources in the Gardai and
the office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement and how the lack of given
resources affect the number of fraud cases prosecuted in Ireland.
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7.6

Conclusion

Previous research called for more research into occupational fraud. This study
attempts to answer this calling by describing and analysing the reported cases of
occupational fraud in Ireland from 2002 to 2013. The results of this dissertation
confirm the findings of Cohen et al. (2010) that the auditing standards could be
strengthened by using the elements of the FT/TPB framework. In doing this, ISA
240 could be expanded to include more examples of fraudulent activity. It
confirms that more examples of incentives and attitude toward the fraud,
subjective norms, perceived behavioural controls and moral obligation should be
included in the auditing standard.

This study also explored why it is difficult to bring a conviction for occupational
fraud in Ireland. The study found the multifarious methods of committing fraud,
the status of the fraudster, difficulties in detecting fraud, advances in technology,
law not keeping pace, reluctance by organisations to report fraud, and the fact that
not all frauds are accidental, are factors in keeping the conviction rate for
occupational fraud so low in Ireland.

It is important that the professional standards and the resources of those charged
with prosecuting fraud are strengthened to give further insight into occupational
fraud. The difficulties in convicting fraud should also be considered by those
tasked with safeguarding organisations assets. This should lead to a reduction in
the effects of occupational fraud in organisations and in wider society.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: ISA 240 Examples of Fraud7

Risk factors relating to misstatements from Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Incentives/
pressures

Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic,
industry, or entity operating conditions, such as (or as
indicated by):
 High degree of competition or market saturation,
accompanied by declining margins
 High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes
in technology, product obsolescence, or interest rates
 Significant declines in customer demand and
increasing business failures in either the industry or
overall economy
 Operating losses making the threat of bankruptcy,
foreclosure, or hostile takeover imminent
 Recurring negative cash flows from operations or
an inability to generate cash flow from operations
while reporting earnings and earnings growth
 Rapid growth or unusual profitability especially
compared to that of other companies in the same
industry
 New
accounting,
statutory,
or
regulatory
requirements
Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the
requirements or expectations of third parties due to the
following:
 Profitability or trend level expectations of investment
analysis, institutional investors, significant creditors,
or other external parties (particularly expectations
that are unduly aggressive or unrealistic), including
expectations created by management in, for example,
overly optimistic press releases or annual report
messages
 Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to
stay competitive – including financing or major

7 Highlighted areas are examples found in the research of convicted Irish Fraud (2002-2013)
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Risk factors relating to misstatements from Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Incentives/
Pressures

Opportunities

research and development or capital expenditure
 Marginal ability to meet exchange listing
requirements or debt repayments or other debt
covenant requirements
 Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor
financial results on significant pending transactions,
such as business combinations or contract awards
Information available indicates that the personal financial
situation of management or those charged with governance
is threatened by the entity’s financial performance arising
from the following:
 Significant financial interest in the entity
 Significant portions of their compensation (for
example, bonuses, stock options, and earn-out
arrangements) being contingent upon achieving
aggressive targets for stock price, operating results,
financial position, or cash flows
 Personal guarantees of debt of the entity
There is excessive pressure on management or operating
personnel to meet financial targets established by those
charged with governance, including sales or profitability
incentive goals
The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides
opportunities to engage in fraudulent financial reporting that
can arise from the following:
 Significant related-party transactions not in the
ordinary course of business or with related entities
not audited or audited by other firms
 A strong financial presence or ability to dominate a
certain industry sector that allows the entity to dictate
terms or conditions to suppliers or customers that
may result in inappropriate o non-arm’s-length
transactions
 Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on
significant estimates that involve subjective,
judgements or uncertainties that are difficult to
corroborate
 Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions,
especially those close to period end that pose difficult
“substance over form” questions
 Significant operations located or conducted across
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Risk factors relating to misstatements from Fraudulent Financial Reporting

Opportunities

Attitudes/
Rationalisations

international borders in jurisdictions where differing
business environments and cultures exist
 Use of business intermediaries for which there
appears to be no clear business justifications
 Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch
operations in tax-haven jurisdictions for which there
appears to be no clear business justification
The monitoring of management is not effective as a result of
the following:
 Domination of management by a single person or
small group (in a non-owner managed business)
without compensating controls
 Oversight by those charged with governance over the
financial reporting process and internal control is not
effective
There is a complex or unstable organisational structure, as
evidenced by the following
 Difficulty in determining the organization or
individuals that have controlling interest in the entity
 Overly complex organisational structure involving
unusual legal entities or managerial lines of authority
 High turnover of senior management, legal counsel,
or those charged with governance
Internal control components are deficient as a result of the
following:
Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated
controls and controls over interim financial reporting (where
external reporting is required)
High turnover rates in employment of accounting, internal
audit, or information technology standards that are not
effective
Accounting and information systems that are not effective,
including situations involving significant deficiencies in
internal control
 Communication, implementation, support, or
enforcement of the entity’s values or ethical
standards by management, or the communication of
inappropriate values or ethical standards, that are not
effective
 Nonfinancial management’s excessive participation
in or preoccupation with the selection of accounting
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Risk factors relating to misstatements from Fraudulent Financial Reporting

Attitudes/
Rationalisations

policies or the determination of significant estimates
 Known history of violations of securities laws or
other laws and regulations, or claims against the
entity, its senior management, or those charged with
governance alleging fraud or violations of laws and
regulations
 Excessive interest by management in maintaining or
increasing the entity’s stock price or earnings trend
 The practice by management of committing to
analysts, creditors, and other third parties to achieve
aggressive or unrealistic forecasts
 Management failing to remedy known significant
deficiencies in internal control on a timely basis
 An interest by management in employing
inappropriate means to minimise reported
earnings for tax-motivated reasons
 Low morale among senior management
 The owner-manager makes no distinction between
personal and business transactions
 Dispute between shareholders in a closely held entity
 Recurring attempts by management to justify
marginal or inappropriate accounting on the basis of
materiality
The relationship between management and the current or
predecessor auditor is strained, as exhibited by the
following:
 Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor
auditor on accounting, auditing, or reported matters
 Unreasonable demands on the auditor, such as
unrealistic time constraints regarding the completion
of the audit or the issuance of the auditors’ report
 Restrictions in the auditor that inappropriately limit
access to people of information or the ability to
communicate effectively with those charged with
governance
 Domineering management behaviour in dealing with
the auditor, especially involving attempts to
influence the scope of the auditor’s work or the
selection or continuance of personnel assigned to or
consulted on the audit engagement
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Risk factors arising from misstatements arising from Misappropriation of Assets
Incentives/
Pressures

Personal financial obligations may create pressure on
management or employees with access to cash or other assets
susceptible to theft to misappropriate those assets
Adverse relationships between the entity and employees
with access to cash or other assets susceptible to theft may
motivate those employees to misappropriate those assets. For
example, adverse relationships may be created by the
following:
 Known or anticipated future employee layoffs
 Recent or anticipated changes to employee
compensation or benefit plans
 Promotions, compensation or other rewards inconsistent
with expectations

Opportunities
Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the
susceptibility of assets to misappropriation. For example,
opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are
the following:
 Large amounts of cash on hand or processed
 Inventory items that are small in size, of high value or in
high demand
 Easily convertible assets, such as bearer bonds,
diamonds or computer chips
 Fixed assets which are small in size, marketable, or
lacking observable identification of ownership
Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the
susceptibility of misappropriation of those assets. For example,
misappropriation of assets may occur because there is the
following:
 Inadequate segregation of duties or independent
checks
 Inadequate oversight of senior management
expenditures, such as travel and other reimbursements
 Inadequate management oversight of employees
responsible for assets, for example, inadequate
supervision or monitoring of remote locations
 Inadequate job applicant screening of employees with
access to assets
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Risk factors arising from misstatements arising from Misappropriation of Assets










Attitude/
Rationalisation








Inadequate record keeping with respect to assets
Inadequate system of authorisation and approval of
transactions (for example, in purchasing)
Inadequate physical safeguards over cash, investments,
inventory or fixed assets
Lack of complete and timely reconciliations of assets
Lack of timely and appropriate documentation of
transactions, for example merchandise returns
Lack of mandatory vacations for employees performing
key control functions
Inadequate
management
understanding
of
information technology, which enables information
technology
employees
to
perpetrate
a
misappropriation
Inadequate access controls over automated records,
including controls over and review of computer systems
event logs
Disregard for the need for monitoring or reducing risks
related to misappropriations of assets
Disregard for internal control over misappropriation
of assets by overriding existing controls or by failing
to take appropriate remedial action on known
deficiencies in internal control
Behaviour indicating displeasure or dissatisfaction
with the entity or its treatment of the employee
Changes in behaviour or lifestyle that may indicate
assets have been misappropriated
Tolerance of petty theft
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Appendix B

Elements of Irish fraud cases included in ISA 240

Element of the

Elements from Irish fraud cases present in ISA 240

FT/TPB
Incentives/

1. Significant financial interest in the entity (PIC)

pressures

2. Recurring negative cash flows from operations or an
inability to generate cash flows from operations while
reporting earnings and earnings growth
3. Personal financial obligations (PIC)
4. Adverse relationship between entity and employees with
access to assets (layoffs)

Opportunities

1. Domination of management by a single person without
compensating controls (PIC)
2. Large amounts of cash on hand or processed
3. Inadequate internal control over assets
4. Inadequate oversight of senior management expenditure,
such as travel and other re-imbursements.
5. Inadequate segregation of duties and independent checks
6. Inadequate system of authorization and approval of
transactions
7. Inadequate management understanding of information
technology

Attitudes/

1.

Rationalisations

An interest by management in employing inappropriate
means to minimise reported earnings for tax-motivated
reasons

2.

The owner-manager makes no distinction between
personal and business transactions (PIC)

3.

Disregard for internal controls over misappropriation of
assets or failing to correct known internal controls

4.

Changes in behaviour or lifestyle that may indicate
assets have been misappropriated

5.

Behaviour indicating displeasure or dissatisfaction with
the entity or its treatment of the employee

Key – PIC – Present in the research compiled by Cohen et al. (2010)
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